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This review has been commissioned by the Scottish Sentencing Council to summarise existing 
academic, legal and statistical work on the sentencing of environmental and wildlife offences. It will 
inform, support and form a part of the Council’s preparatory work for developing sentencing 
guidelines for use by the Scottish criminal courts in the disposition of environmental and wildlife 
offences. 
The authors have chosen to assess separately the prosecution and sentencing of environmental 
crimes, on the one hand, and wildlife crimes, on the other hand, in order to reflect properly the 
distinctive complexity of the latter offences. Accordingly, the environmental offences discussed are 
mainly those referred to the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) by the Scottish 
Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) under the latter’s waste regime1, PPC regime2 , water regime3 
and under section 110 of the Environment Act 1995.4 However, the review will not consider other 
enforcement action taken by SEPA such as civil sanctions or action taken under the provisions of the 
Environmental Regulation (Enforcement Measures) (Scotland) Order 2015.5 The review will also not 
consider noise nuisance,6 odour nuisance7 or dog fouling.8 
                                                             
1The Environmental Protection Act 1990 and The Waste Management Licensing Regulations 1994. 
2 Pollution Prevention and Control (Scotland) Regulations 2012. 
3 The Water Environment (Controlled Activities) (Scotland) Regulations 2011. 
4 The Regulatory Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 extended the circumstances to which section 110(1) could apply, 
to include intentionally assaulting, hindering or obstructing a SEPA officer. 
5 The Regulatory Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 and the 2015 Order provided SEPA with new enforcement 
measures such as fixed monetary penalties and variable monetary penalties, with a right of appeal against final 
notices to the Scottish Land Court. 
6 As provided for e.g. in Part 5 of the Antisocial Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act 2004, as a statutory nuisance in 
Part 3 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 and under common law. 
7 As a statutory nuisance in Part 3 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. 
8The Dog Fouling (Scotland) Act 2003. 
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The wildlife offences discussed are those providing against cruelty to wild animals9, poaching10, trade 
in endangered species11, those providing for animal conservation12 and those providing for protection 
and conservation of habitats13 The review will not consider offences providing against cruelty or 
neglect of ‘protected animals’14, essentially non-wild animals. 
The review of the practice of prosecution and sentencing in Scotland with regard to environmental 
and wildlife offences, respectively, is structured in a specific order. In the first place, the emergence 
of these types of offences are discussed in a historical perspective, with reference also to the European 
and global regulatory context in which they appear. Secondly, the legal definition and classification of 
the covered offences are then discussed, against the background of a criminological assessment of the 
associated socio-environmental harms. Finally, empirical data regarding the actual practice of 
prosecution and sentencing of these offences are discussed against the backdrop of sociological data 
on the public perception, wherever these are available.  
This methodology will then be used to devise an operational definition of environmental and wildlife 
crimes, as well as an overview over sentencing of environmental and wildlife crimes in Scotland, in 
subsequent sections of this review. 
2. Environmental offences and environmental criminal law in historical perspective 
2.1 Origins of environmental criminal law. A comparative perspective 
In the broader European context, the emergence of environmental criminal law and, hence, that of 
the notion of environmental crime, is directly linked to the very appearance of environmental law. In 
other words, environmental crimes and environmental criminal law were initially by-products of 
environmental regulation as legislators relied primarily on criminal law for the enforcement of newly 
established standards of environmental protection.15 This early and intimate connection between 
environmental and criminal law is not a uniquely European phenomenon, but existed equally in other 
Western jurisdictions, such as the United States.16 Faure highlights two specific features of these early 
environmental crimes: they only occupied a marginal place in domestic criminal law systems; and, 
within European continental administrative law traditions with a structural reliance on criminal law 
for enforcement, environmental crimes were initially limited to penalising non-compliance with 
administrative obligations (regulatory crimes).17 
                                                             
9  The Wild Mammals (Protection) Act 1996, the Animal Health and Welfare (Scotland) Act 2006, the Protection 
of Wild Mammals (Scotland) Act 2002 and the Protection of Badgers Act 1992.    
10The Deer (Scotland) Act 1996, the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 2003, the 
Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 and the Scotland Act 1998 (River Tweed) Order 2006. 
11 Control of Trade in Endangered Species (Enforcement) Regulations 1997. 
12   The Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004, the Wildlife and Natural Environment (Scotland) Act 2011, the 
Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 and the Conservation (Natural Habitats &c.) Regulations 1994. 
13The Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004, the Conservation (Natural Habitats &c.) Regulations 1994 and 
the Marine (Scotland) Act 2010. 
14 Defined by section 17 (1) of the Animal Health and Welfare (Scotland) Act 2006 as inter alia ‘not living in a 
wild state’. 
15 M Faure, ‘The Development of Environmental Criminal Law in the EU and Its Member States’ (2017) 26 Review 
of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 139; M Faure, ‘The Evolution of Environmental 
Crime Law in Europe: A Comparative Analysis’ in A Farmer, M Faure and GM Vagliasindi (eds), Environmental 
Crime in Europe (Hart 2017), 267. 
16 DM Uhlmann, ‘Environmental Crime Comes of Age: The Evolution of Criminal Enforcement in the 
Environmental Regulatory Scheme’ (2009) 4 Utah Law Review 1223. 
17 Faure, ‘The Development of Environmental Criminal Law in the EU and Its Member States’ (n 15), at 140. 
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This structural reliance on criminal law in order to ensure the smooth operation of administrative law, 
however, came at a price. First of all, the instrumentality of criminal law for environmental law 
enforcement led to a piecemeal approach in the definition of specific environmental offences. As a 
consequence, these would typically appear scattered throughout different pieces of environmental 
legislation and lacked (at least originally) the systematicity needed for a cohesive enforcement 
strategy. Secondly, a further aspect worth mentioning is the uneasy position that novel environmental 
offences were to have within the traditional categories of criminal law. Due to the instrumentality of 
these offences for the enforcement of environmental standards, crucial definitional elements thereof 
are frequently contingent upon decisions of administrative authorities (e.g., authorisations that 
specify environmental standards in a concrete situation). This feature of so-called ‘blank’ 
environmental crimes is nevertheless at odds with the strict principle of legality in criminal law. 18 
Thirdly, not entirely unrelated to the previous, environmental crimes have commonly been perceived 
as less serious offences across European jurisdictions. Notwithstanding different perspectives and 
cultural sensitivities in different countries, environmental crimes have been critically regarded by 
European prosecutors and judges as difficult to define, identify and use effectively.19 
Despite the substantial differences of the common law system vis-à-vis the continental systems, the 
historical origins of environmental crimes and criminal law in the United Kingdom broadly coincide 
with the previous parameters.20 While Scotland had no equivalent of the landmark Birmingham 
Corporation case,21 taken on the basis of common law nuisance, its environmental legislation 
developed along the same lines as that in England and Wales, focussing on public health e.g. The Public 
Health (Scotland) Act 1867 well into the 20th century. Legislation such as the Clean Air Act 1957 and 
the statutes establishing River Purification Authorities in the 1950s was piecemeal, and enforced by a 
range of different agencies, principally local authorities. It was only until the 1990s, with the 
Environmental Protection Act 1990 and the establishment of SEPA in 1996 that environmental 
enforcement became institutionally centralised.  
These legislative developments were also matched with parallel debates in academia. The outlined 
interactions between criminal law and environmental law enforcement attracted the attention not 
only from legal scholarship, but also from criminologists. Green criminology emerged as a strand of 
criminological scholarship over the decade of the 1990s, emphasising more generally ‘the importance 
of engagement with the bio-physical and socio-economic consequences of various sources of threat 
and damage to the environment’.22 It advocated for a move from environmental crimes towards 
environmental harms. Especially critical green criminology contributed to shifting the focus beyond 
state-based definitions of crime, towards more comprehensive understandings of social and 
environmental harms deriving from human activities, whether legal or illegal.23 According to Faure, at 
least a number of European legislators drew conclusions from the aforementioned experiences.24 
Especially in the 1990s, environmental offences were being gathered in criminal codes or special 
                                                             
18 ibid, at 141. 
19 M Faure and K Svatikova, ‘Criminal or Administrative Law to Protect the Environment? Evidence from Western 
Europe’ (2012) 24 Journal of Environmental Law 253. 
20 E Fasoli, ‘Environmental Criminal Law in the United Kingdom’ in A Farmer, M Faure and GM Vagliasindi (eds), 
Environmental Crime in Europe (Hart 2017), 243. 
21 Attorney General v Birmingham Corporation (1858) 4 K&J 528. 
22 N South, ‘Environmental Crimes and Harms: A Green Criminology Approach and Socio-Legal Challenges’ in T 
Bergin and E Orlando (eds), Forging a Socio-Legal Approach to Environmental Harms. Global Perspectives 
(Routledge 2017), 20. 
23 R McKie and others, ‘Green Criminology and the Prevention of Ecological Destruction’ in T Bergin and E 
Orlando (eds), Forging a Socio-Legal Approach to Environmental Harms. Global Perspectives (Routledge 2017), 
38. 
24 Faure, ‘The Development of Environmental Criminal Law in the EU and Its Member States’ (n 15), at 141-3. 
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statutes. In addition to regulatory crimes (mala prohibita), these new instruments would feature at 
least some offences giving rise to criminal liability when specific thresholds of environmental harm 
were reached (mala in se), even in the absence of specific administrative obligations.25 Arguably, 
environmental offences as mala in se have always had a basis in common law in the UK.26 Moreover, 
a partial attempt to systematise regulatory environmental offences was made in the Environmental 
Protection Act 1990 and the Water Resources Act 1991.27  
At the same time, managerial approaches28 and law and economics approaches29 developed within 
legal scholarship in order to cope with pervasive enforcement deficits of environmental law. These 
approaches were advocating for a smarter, more nuanced, incremental and effective compliance and 
enforcement strategy for environmental law, in which criminal law and environmental crimes were to 
have a much more limited, yet crucial, role as sanctions of last resort.30 The insights gained from these 
approaches contributed to a new ‘toolbox approach’ for environmental law enforcement in many 
European countries.31 In the UK, this approach was most prominently implemented in England and 
Wales through the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act (2008) and, more recently, through the 
Regulatory Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 in Scotland.  
2.2 The transnational and European dimension of environmental criminal law 
This succinct historical overview of the origins of environmental criminal law and associated scholarly 
debates would not be complete without acknowledging the impact of increasingly complex networked 
and organised structures of transnational criminality that have brought about an increased trend 
towards the criminalisation of global enforcement strategies associated to key international treaties 
regarding environmental protection.32 Multilateral environmental agreements (MEA) facing pervasive 
compliance challenges through emerging black markets in environmentally-sensitive commodities 
have adopted a strategy of coordination and cooperation to increase their respective effectiveness. 33 
This process has led to the gradual criminalization of illegal trade and the emergence of the notion of 
transnational environmental crime.34 The influence of transnational environmental enforcement 
networks35 in this drive towards criminal law has been particularly relevant in the context of the ozone 
                                                             
25 ibid, at 142. 
26 Supra n 21. 
27 Fasoli (n 20) 244. 
28 A Chayes and A Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty. Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements 
(Harvard UP 1995). 
29 I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (OUP 1992). 
30 R Macrory, ‘Regulatory Justice. Making Sanctions Effective.’ (2006). 
31 G Pink and M Marshall, ‘Sanction Mapping: A Tool for Fine-Tuning Environmental Regulatory Intervention 
Strategies’ in M de Bree and H Ruessink (eds), Innovating Environmental Compliance Assurance (INECE 2015), 
85. 
32 Lorraine Elliott, ‘Criminal Networks and Illicit Chains of Custody in Transnational Environmental Crime’ in 
Lorraine Elliott and William H Schaedla (eds), Handbook of Transnational Environmental Crime (Edward Elgar 
2016). 
33 A Cardesa-Salzmann, ‘Multilateral Environmental Agreements and Illegality’ in Lorraine Elliott and William H 
Schaedla (eds), Handbook of Transnational Environmental Crime (Edward Elgar 2016). 
34 L Elliott, ‘Fighting Transnational Environmental Crime’ (2012) 66 Journal of International Affairs 87; L Elliott, 
‘Cooperation on Transnational Environmental Crime: Institutional Complexity Matters’ (2017) 26 Review of 
European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 107. 
35 G Pink, ‘Environmental Enforcement Networks: Theory, Practice and Potential’ in M Faure, P De Smet and A 
Stas (eds), Environmental Enforcement Networks. Concepts, Implementation and Effectiveness (Edward Elgar 
2015) 13. 
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regime.36 However, their ascendancy has also intensified the degree of the criminal law and justice 
response to illegal shipments of waste37 and, above all, illegal wildlife traffic. 38 
In Europe, the first attempt for a coordinated approach towards common standards for common 
approaches and standards for environmental protection through criminal law were adopted under 
the aegis of the Council of Europe,39 with the signature of the 1998 Convention on the Protection of 
Environment through Criminal Law.40 The United Kingdom, however, was not among the signatory 
countries. Moreover, the Convention was eventually overshadowed by the approximation of 
environmental criminal law within the institutional setting of the EU and failed to gather the required 
ratifications for its entry into force.41  
Indeed, regulatory disparity between Member States regarding environmental crimes and the 
increased international pressure to address transnational environmental criminality triggered EU 
legislative action. After the Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA,42 which was eventually 
annulled by the Court of Justice of the European Union,43 the European Parliament and the Council 
enacted the 2008 Environmental Crime Directive (ECD).44 For the purpose of this literature review, 
two significant aspects of the ECD should be kept in mind:     
1) The ECD approximates the laws of the Member States regarding the typical elements of 
specific environmental offences, but leaves aside the determination of the type and level of 
associated criminal penalties. It merely states that Member States shall adopt ‘effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties.’45 This regulatory approach was the result of 
the CJEU’s rulings in the dispute between the Council and the European Commission regarding 
the legal basis and the extent of the EU’s competence in the field of criminal law. At the time, 
the Court held that the EU lacked the powers to do so.46 While the latest amendments of the 
EU treaties provides in principle this kind of competence, no steps have been taken so far in 
order to harmonise criminal sanctions in the area of environmental offences. 47 
                                                             
36 N Liu, V Somboon and C Middleton, ‘Illegal Trade in Ozone Depleting Substances’ in L Elliott and W Schaedla 
(eds), Handbook of Transnational Environmental Crime (Edward Elgar 2016); E Clark, ‘The Montreal Protocol and 
OzonAction Networks’ in L Elliott and W Schaedla (eds), Handbook of Transnational Environmental Crime 
(Edward Elgar 2016). 
37 L Bisschop, ‘Illegal Trade in Hazardous Waste’ in L Elliott and W Schaedla (eds), Handbook of Transnational 
Environmental Crime (Edward Elgar 2016). 
38 Rosaleen Duffy, ‘The Illegal Wildlife Trade in Global Perspective’ in L Elliott and WH Schaedla (eds), Handbook 
of Transnational Environmental Crime (Edward Elgar 2016). 
39 See e.g. Council of Europe, Resolution on the contribution of criminal law to the protection of the 
environment, CM/Res (77) 28 (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 28 September 1977, at the 275th 
meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies). 
40 Convention on the Protection of Environment through Criminal Law (adopted on 4 November 1998, not yet in 
force) ETS No. 172. 
41 Grazia Maria Vagliasindi, ‘The EU Environmental Crime Directive’ in Andrew Farmer, Michael Faure and Grazia 
Maria Vagliasindi (eds), Environmental Crime in Europe (Hart 2017) 36. 
42 Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 27 January 2003 on the protection of the environment through 
criminal law [2003] OJ L29/55. 
43 CJEU, C-176/03, Commission v Council, [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:542. 
44 Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on the protection 
of the environment through criminal law [2008] OJ L328/28. Hereinafter, ECD. 
45 Art. 5 ECD. 
46 CJEU, C-176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:542. CJEU (Grand Chamber), C-440/05 
Commission v Council [2007] ECLI:EU:C:2007:625. 
47 Art 83 TFEU. See in this regard Giovanni Grasso, ‘EU Harmonisation Competences in Criminal Matters and 
Environmental Crime’ in Andrew Farmer, Michael Faure and Grazia Maria Vagliasindi (eds), Environmental Crime 
[7] 
2) In view of the UK´s forthcoming withdrawal from the EU will indeed lose its current 
significance, in terms of regulatory stability and –most importantly – in terms of the hard 
enforcement edge provided by EU law.48 Nevertheless, even under the EU (Withdrawal) Act 
2018, the ECD will arguably keep some residual relevance, as it has shaped current 
environmental and wildlife offences in UK legislation and provides benchmarks for the 
coordinated implementation and compliance with international obligations that the UK has 
undertaken as Party to several MEAs for combating transnational environmental crime. These 
international commitments will remain after Brexit.49  
3. Typology of environmental offences 
Environmental criminal law in the UK and, more specifically, in Scotland, is piecemeal and scattered in 
different statutes, with the ECD providing a minimum common denominator regarding environmental 
offences. While commonly classified according to sectoral (e.g. waste, water, air pollution offences) 
or geographical criteria (purely domestic vis-à-vis transnational environmental crimes),50 
environmental crimes remain difficult to typify. In this section we will take the ECD’s provisions as a 
starting point, in order to map out and classify environmental offences in UK and Scottish Law against 
the background of a criminological assessment of the associated socio-environmental harms. This 
classification will pave the way for a discussion of the prosecution and sentencing fo the tifferent types 
of offences in successive sections. 
3.1 Environmental offences in the ECD 
Under the ECD,51 environmental offences require an unlawful conduct.52 This requirement thus 
precludes purely harm-based offences that would criminalise conducts causing socio-environmental 
harms regarless of their lawfulness or unlawfulness. Environmental offences further require to have 
been ‘committed intentionally or with at least serious negligence.’53 Inciting, aiding and abetting the 
intentional conduct is also to be considered a criminal offence.54 The minimum requirement of serious 
negligence seeks to enhance the last resort character of the criminal law response in environmental 
law enforcement.  
Further, article 3 ECD delineates the environmental offences. In so doing, this provision discriminates 
between a majority of harm-based or concrete endangerment offences and abstract endangerment 
or purely regulatory offences. As Vagliasindi points out, transnational environmental crimes, i.e., 
illegal shipments of waste,55 illegal trade in endangered species56 and the illegal production 
                                                             
in Europe (Hart 2017); Ludwig Krämer, ‘The EU and the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law’ in 
Tiffany Bergin and Emanuela Orlando (eds), Forging a Socio-Legal Approach to Environmental Harms. Global 
Perspectives (Routledge 2017) 60. 
48 A Cardesa-Salzmann and others, ‘The Implications of Brexit for Environmental Law in Scotland’ (2016) 3–4. 
49 ibid 7. 
50 Carole Gibbs and Rachel Boratto, Environmental Crime, vol 1 (Oxford University Press 2017) 10. 
51 Art 3 ECD. 
52 Art 2(a) ECD defines the meaning of ‘unlawful’ for the purpose of the directive, which is in essence linked to 
the infringement of EU environmental legislation or Member State implementing legislative and/or regulatory 
measures. On the intrinsic shortcomings of this definition and the issues it creates from the perspective of the 
legality principle, see Krämer (n 47) 61. 
53 Art 3 ECD. 
54 Art 4 ECD. 
55 Art 3(c) ECD. 
56 Art 3(g) ECD. This provision, however, gives leeway in cases ‘where the conduct concerns a negligible quantity 
of … specimens [of protected wild fauna or flora species] and has a negligible impact on the conservation status 
of the species.’ 
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production, importation, exportation and placing on the market or use of ozone-depleting 
substances,57 clearly belong to this latter category.58 All other offences, in contrast, require the 
causation (or likelihood thereof) of death or serious injury to persons, or substantial environmental 
damage. These are defined in article 3 ECD as follows: 
(a) the discharge, emission or introduction of a quantity of materials or ionising radiation into air, 
soil or water, which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial 
damage to the quality of air, the quality of soil or the quality of water, or to animals or plants; 
(b) the collection, transport, recovery or disposal of waste, including the supervision of such 
operations and the after-care of disposal sites, and including action taken as a dealer or a broker 
(waste management), which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or 
substantial damage to the quality of air, the quality of soil or the quality of water, or to animals or 
plants; […] 
(d) the operation of a plant in which a dangerous activity is carried out or in which dangerous 
substances or preparations are stored or used and which, outside the plant, causes or is likely to 
cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to the quality of air, the quality 
of soil or the quality of water, or to animals or plants; 
(e) the production, processing, handling, use, holding, storage, transport, import, export or disposal 
of nuclear materials or other hazardous radioactive substances which causes or is likely to cause 
death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to the quality of air, the quality of soil 
or the quality of water, or to animals or plants; 
(f) the killing, destruction, possession or taking of specimens of protected wild fauna or flora species, 
except for cases where the conduct concerns a negligible quantity of such specimens and has a 
negligible impact on the conservation status of the species; 
(h) any conduct which causes the significant deterioration of a habitat within a protected site; 
3.2 Environmental offences in UK and Scottish Law 
Overall, the UK has not only fully transposed the ECD into its domestic legal order, but has also gone 
significantly beyond the requirements of the directive.59 Environmental offences are nearly always 
strict liability offences i.e. there is no need for the prosecution to prove mens rea or negligence and 
the accused can often be convicted in circumstances where they are not, in the normal sense of the 
word, blameworthy.60 Strict liability is applicable only to statutory offences and is usually applicable 
in circumstances where the offence is one which society particularly wants to deter and wants to be 
able to prosecute easily.61 Strict liability is, however, contrary to basic liberal Rule of Law principles 
which suggest that a person should only be criminally guilty of an act for which they are responsible, 
                                                             
57 Art. 3(i) ECD. 
58 Vagliasindi (n 41) 48. 
59 Fasoli (n 20) 248. Relying also on Evaluation Study on the Implementation of Directive 2008/99/EC on the 
Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law by Member States, National Report for the United Kingdom 
(Ares(2015)5176917–18.11.2015). 
60 However, blameworthiness or lack of it in respect of e.g. general recklessness or negligence, seeking to profit 
from the offence or immediate remediation of harm may be a factor to be considered both by SEPA and COPFS 
when exercising their discretion whether or not to prosecute, or by the court when determining sentence when 
it can act as either a mitigating or aggravating factor. See Neil Parpworth, Katharine Thompson and Brian Jones, 
‘Environmental Offences: Utilising Civil Penalties’ [2005] Journal of Planning & Environment Law 560. 
61 For example, the offence of carrying offensive weapons or bladed/pointed articles in public under ss47 and 
49 of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995. 
[9] 
in the sense of having intended to carry out the act.62 However, proponents of the doctrine, as well as 
emphasising the ‘crime control’ 63 benefits, would argue that such injustice is negligible, given that, in 
their view64, most strict liability offences are regulatory in nature, less serious than common law 
crimes, attracting less social disapproval and only wrong because a statute has deemed them to be 
so.65 This, in turn, has prompted observers over the years to blame this implied status of 
environmental offences (at least in part) for the way, in their view, that these offences are rationalised, 
minimised and rendered somehow ‘less serious’ than other offences dealt with by the criminal justice 
system, leading to inadequate sentences. 66 
The doctrine, however, is well established in environmental law. The leading English case, Alphacell 
Ltd v Woodward67 was followed in Scotland by Lockhart v National Coal Board68, which held that 
(1) the prosecution must prove simply that the accused carried out an active operation, the natural 
consequence of which is that pollution occurred 
(2) negligence, mens rea, or knowledge on the part of the accused need not be established; and  
(3) in terms of causation, natural forces, the act of a third party or an act of God, may create factual 
conditions whereby the accused will not be held to have ‘caused’ the event. 
That last point was narrowed somewhat in the English case of Empress Car Company (Abertillery) Ltd 
v National Rivers Authority69 when it was held that the defendant had caused pollution when diesel 
fuel entered controlled waters70 because an unidentified third party had opened an outlet tap which, 
crucially, could not be locked and the oil had breached a bund which, again significantly, had been 
rendered ineffective by the defendant. The opening of the tap was not regarded as a novus actus 
interveniens71 because the defendant had created the conditions under which a spill could happen 
and the action of the third party was not an extraordinary one, which had it been so, would have 
broken the chain of causation and the defendant would not have caused the pollution.72 
                                                             
62 See Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132, which led to subsequent drug laws including a mens rea component. 
63 Strict liability is a feature of a legal system under the influence of a ‘crime control’ model, as opposed to its 
opposite, a ‘due process’ model as propounded by Herbert L Packer, ‘Two Models of the Criminal Process’ (1964) 
113 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1, 9–13. Most would agree that all liberal democratic legal systems 
exhibit characteristics of both models. 
64 Though this is contestable; driving while under the influence of alcohol is a strict liability offence while socially 
unacceptable, though this may well be due to changes in society’s moral outlook, which strict liability arguably 
played a part in altering. 
65 Drawing on the traditional division of criminal activity into mala in se (actions universally regarded as morally 
wrong) and mala prohibita (actions deemed wrong only by positive, human-made, law and then only for 
regulatory purposes). See Pamela R Ferguson and Claire McDiarmid, Scots Criminal Law: A Critical Analysis (2nd 
ed, Edinburgh University Press 2014) 450–468. 
66 Julie Adshead, ‘Doing Justice to the Environment’ (2013) 77 The Journal of Criminal Law 215; P De Prez, 
‘Excuses, Excuses: The Ritual Trivialisation of Environmental Prosecutions’ (2000) 12 Journal of Environmental 
Law 65; Parpworth, Thompson and Jones (n 60).   
67 [1972] AC 824. 
68 1981 SCCR 9 at 15. 
69 [1998] Env LR 396, HL. 
70 Contrary to the Water Resources Act 1991 s85(1). 
71 Literally, ’a new, intervening act’ which breaks the causal link between the accused’s initial act and the final 
consequence. 
72 While Empress Car Company would be persuasive on a Scottish court, it may not be binding. 
[10] 
In R. v Milford Haven Port Authority (The Sea Empress) 73, Lord Bingham laid out the rationale of strict 
liability as follows:  
Parliament creates an offence of strict liability because it regards the doing or not doing of a 
particular thing as itself so undesirable as to merit the imposition of criminal punishment on anyone 
who does or does not do that thing irrespective of that party’s knowledge, state of mind, belief or 
intention. This involves a departure from the prevailing canons of the criminal law because of the 
importance which is attached to achieving the result which Parliament seeks to achieve.74 
Absolute strict liability environmental offences75 are, however, rare and most offences ameliorate the 
potential unfairness of strict liability by providing statutory defences.76 Despite such defences prima 
facie transferring a persuasive burden of proof to the accused, this is often removed or ‘read down’ 
either by the application of case law or statute.77 However, the defences are construed narrowly to 
avoid negating the very principle of strict liability itself.78 79 Despite the absence of fault being 
irrelevant to establishing whether an offence has been committed, it is however relevant at the 
sentencing stage,80 and is regularly pled in mitigation.81 
In the following, a brief overview of the main environmental offences will be provided, as defined in 
UK and Scottish law. 
3.2.1 Waste 
In respect of waste legislation, one of the principal provisions is s33 of the EPA 1990 which prohibits 
the disposal of controlled waste in any way not permitted by the Act. Section 33 (1) provides that a 
person shall not: 
(a)  deposit controlled waste, or knowingly cause or knowingly permit controlled waste to be 
deposited in or on any land unless a waste management licence authorising the deposit is in force 
and the deposit is in accordance with the licence; 
(b)  treat, keep or dispose of controlled waste, or knowingly cause or knowingly permit controlled 
waste to be treated, kept or disposed of—  
(i)  in or on any land, or  
(ii)  by means of any mobile plant, except under and in accordance with a waste management 
licence; 
                                                             
73 R. v Milford Haven Port Authority (The Sea Empress) [2000] Env. L.R. 632. 
74 Ibid, at 644. 
75 For which there are no defences. 
76 For example, by the accused proving they had exercised reasonable precautions and due diligence to avoid 
committing the offence, as in s33 (7) of the EPA 1990. 
77 R v Lambert [2001] UKHL 37, Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, Schedule 3, para 16. 
78See Durham County Council v Peter O’Connor Industrial Services [1993] Env LR 197 and, less narrowly, Express 
Ltd (t/a Express Dairies Distribution) v Environment Agency [2003] Env LR 29. 
79 Stuart Bell and others, Environmental Law (9th edn, OUP 2017) 275. 
80 Sentencing Council, ‘Environmental Offences Guideline. Consultation’ (2013); Scottish Environment Protection 
Agency, ‘Consultation on Determining the Amount of Variable Monetary Penalty’ (2016). 
81 De Prez (n 66). 
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(c)  keep or manage controlled waste in a manner likely to cause pollution of the environment or 
harm to human health. 
A person who contravenes subsection (1) or any condition of a waste management licence commits 
an offence under s33 (6). 
It shall be a defence under s33 (7) for a person charged with the offence to prove (a) that he had 
exercised reasonable precautions and due diligence to avoid committing the offence; or (b) that he 
had acted under his employer’s  instructions and neither knew nor had reason to suppose that what 
he did was an offence; or (c) that his action was taken in an emergency to avoid danger to human 
health and he had taken all reasonably practicable steps for minimising pollution of the environment 
and harm to human health and that SEPA was subsequently informed as soon as reasonably 
practicable 
3.2.2 Water 
The over-arching legislation regulating water pollution in Scotland is the Water Framework Directive 
of 200082 which was transposed into Scots law by Part 1 of the Water Environment and Water Services 
(Scotland) Act 2003. In turn, The Water Environment (Controlled Activities) (Scotland) Regulations 
2011 were made under the 2003 Act83 and apply amongst others to all activities (controlled 
activities84) likely to pollute the water environment or groundwater and any other activity which, 
directly or indirectly, has or is likely to have a significant adverse effect on the water environment85. 
However, controlled activities can be authorised by SEPA and can be carried out if in accordance with 
such authorisation86, of which there are three types. At the least onerous end of the scale is an 
authorisation under the Binding Rules, which is deemed to be given if the activity is carried out in 
accordance with Regulation 6 (1) and Schedule 3 of the 2011 Regulations. A more onerous 
authorisation is Registration of a controlled activity, which SEPA can tailor by imposing conditions on 
the registration and the most onerous is Water Use Licensing, which can again be tailored by the 
imposition of conditions on the licence. 
Under regulation 44 (1) it is an offence inter alia for a person to:  
(a) contravene regulation 4; 
(b) fail to comply with or contravene a general binding rule; 
(c) fail to comply with or contravene a registration (including any condition imposed); 
(d) fail to comply with or contravene a water use licence (including any condition imposed) 
It is also an offence to fail to comply with an enforcement notice87 and there are several other offences 
in connection inter alia with obstruction of SEPA officers and the making of false representations. If 
                                                             
82 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a 
framework for Community action in the field of water policy [2000] OJ L327/1. 
83 Under sections 20 and 36(2) and (3)  of the Water Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Act 2003. 
84 The Water Environment (Controlled Activities) (Scotland) Regulations 2011, regulation 2 (1). 
85 Ibid, regulation 3 (1). 
86 Ibid, regulation 4. 
87 Ibid, regulation 44 (1) (j). 
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an offence is committed by a body corporate88 and can be attributed to any director, manager, 
member or partner of that body, that person is also guilty of that offence.89 
There are defences available to the principal offences90 under Regulation 44 if they are as a result of 
or followed by: 
(a)…  
(i) an accident which could not reasonably have been foreseen; 
(ii) natural causes or force majeure which are exceptional or could not reasonably have been 
foreseen; or 
(iii) an act or omission…. that is reasonably necessary to protect people, property or the 
environment from imminent risk of serious harm; 
(b) all practicable steps are taken to prevent deterioration of the water environment 
(c) all practicable steps are taken as soon as is reasonably practicable to restore the water 
environment to its condition prior to the contravention; and 
(d) particulars of the contravention are furnished to SEPA as soon as practicable after it occurs. 
3.2.3 Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control 
The third major framework for the control of environmental damage is the Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control regime, also administered by SEPA. The COPA 1974 and the EPA 1990 
represented the first attempts to take an integrated approach to often complex environmental 
threats. The EPA identified “prescribed processes”, almost all industrial processes such as inter alia oil 
refining, cement production, chemical production and metal working, which presented complex 
regulatory challenges. The current regime is based on the Pollution Prevention and Control Act 1999, 
and the much more detailed Pollution Prevention and Control (Scotland) Regulations 2012, which also 
implement the Industrial Emissions Directive of 2010.91 Any person who operates an installation 
covered by the Regulations is authorised to do so by a permit granted by SEPA under regulation 11 of 
the Regulations. The conditions attached to such permits are the main way SEPA minimises the effect 
of the installation on the environment, along with its power to serve enforcement, revocation and 
suspension notices on the permit holder.92 
Under regulation 67 it is an offence inter alia for a person: 
(a)  to contravene regulation 11, 
(b)  to fail to comply with or to contravene a condition of a permit, 
(c)  to fail to comply with regulation 45(1), 
                                                             
88 Ibid, regulation 45. 
89 Ibid, regulation 45. 
90 Offences in 44 (1), (a)-(d), (j) and (o). 
91 Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial 
emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) [2010] OJ L 334/17. 
92 Francis McManus, Environmental Law in Scotland: An Introduction and Guide (Edinburgh University Press 
2016) 248–9. 
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(d)  to fail to comply with the requirements of 
(i)  an enforcement notice, 
(ii)  a suspension notice, or  
(iii)  a closure notice under regulation 18(1) of the Landfill Regulations 
Regulation 67 provides for several other offences in connection inter alia with the making of false 
representations. If an offence is committed by a body corporate and can be attributed to any director, 
manager, member or partner of that body, that person is also guilty of that offence.93  
3.2.4 Regulatory Reform Scotland Act 2014 s40 
Under this legislation it is an offence for a person to act, or permit another person to act, in a way that 
causes or is likely to cause significant environmental harm94 Environmental harm is 'significant' if it has 
or may have serious adverse effects, whether locally, nationally or on a wider scale, or it is caused or 
may be caused to an area designated in an order by the Scottish Ministers. An offence is committed 
whether or not the person intended the act to cause, or be likely to cause, significant environmental 
harm, or knew that, or was reckless or careless as to whether, the act would cause or be likely to cause 
such harm. It is a defence to show that the act in question was necessary in order to avoid, prevent or 
reduce an imminent risk of serious adverse effects on human health, provided that the person took 
all such steps as were reasonably practicable in the circumstances to minimise any environmental 
harm, and particulars about the act were given to SEPA  as soon as practicable after the act. It is also 
a defence to show that the act was authorised by or in accordance with regulations relating to 
protecting and improving the environment or another enactment specified by order. 
4. Prosecution and sentencing of environmental crimes 
This section turns towards the prosecution and sentencing of environmental crimes. It starts with a 
brief overview of the relevant legal provisions, before assessing  empirical data regarding the actual 
practice of prosecution and sentencing of these offences in Scotland and comparable jurisdictions, 
against the backdrop of sociological data on the public perception, wherever these are available. In 
line with the approach taken in previous sections, we will start with an overview of the relevant 
provisions in the ECD, as these represent the coordinated approach taken with other EU Member 
States in order to comply especially with international obligations stemming from specific MEAs. 
Against this backdrop, we will then turn to the law and practice of sentencing environmental crimes 
in Scotland and comparable jurisdictions.  
4.1 Provisions on criminal sanctions and sentencing in the ECD 
At the time of the adoption of the ECD, the CJEU had declared that the EU lacked the powers for 
approximating the laws of Member States regarding the establishment of criminal penalties.95 
Therefore, following the CJEU´s judgment, the ECD restrains itself to require Member states to provide 
for effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties for natural persons in response to the 
environmental offences described in articles 3 and 4.96 In addition, Member States must also ensure 
for the liability, as well as effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, of legal persons involved 
in the commission of environmental offences in the terms of articles 6 and 7 ECD. In particular, legal 
persons are to be held liable for the typified conducts ‘where such offences have been committed for 
                                                             
93 Pollution Prevention and Control (Scotland) Regulations 2012, regulation 67 (4). 
94 Regulatory Reform Scotland Act 2014 s40 (1). 
95 CJEU (Grand Chamber), C-440/05 Commission v Council [2007] ECLI:EU:C:2007:625. 
96 Art 5 ECD. 
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their benefit by any person who has a leading position within [it], acting either individually or as part 
of an organ of the legal person’. Member States are also to hold legal persons liable where the 
commission of the offence was made possible due to the lack of supervision or control by any such 
person in a leading position. In order to hold such a leading position, the natural persons must have 
either ‘a power of representation of the legal person; an authority to take decisions on behalf of the 
legal person; or an authority to exercise control within the legal person.’ 
Before the CJEU´s judgment, however, the European Commission´s proposal submitted to the 
European Parliament and the Council provided specific benchmarks for the criminal sanctions for 
natural and legal persons attached to the proposed environmental offences.97 We will briefly outline 
those sanctions in order to provide a glimpse for what the Commission considered to be ‘effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive’ penalties at the time. For natural persons, the proposal envisaged the 
following range: 
• a maximum of at least between 1 and 3 years of imprisonment where the offence is 
committed with serious negligence and causes substantial environmental damage (article 5(2) 
Proposal). 
• a maximum of at least between 2 and 5 years of imprisonment where the offence is 
committed either with serious negligence and causes death of or serious injury to a person, 
or intentionally and causes substantial environmental damage, or is committed in the 
framework of a criminal organisation (article 5(3) Proposal). 
• a maximum of at least between 5 and 10 years of imprisonment where the offence is 
committed intentionally and causes the death of or serious injury to a person (article 5(4) 
Proposal). 
In addition, these penalties could be complemented with additional sanctions or measures, such as 
the disqualification from activities requiring official authorisation, or the involvement in any company 
or foundation where the same kind of criminal activity may be pursued again, the publication of the 
conviction and associated measures, or the obligation to reinstate the environment (article 5(5) of the 
proposal). 
For legal persons, in turn, the following range of criminal or non-criminal fines was foreseen: 
• a maximum of at least between EUR 300,000 and EUR 500,000 in cases where an offence is 
committed with serious negligence and causes substantial environmental damage (article 
7(2)(a) Proposal). 
• a maximum of at least between EUR 500,000 and EUR 750,000 in cases where the offence is 
committed either with serious negligence and causes death of or serious injury to a person, 
or intentionally and causes substantial environmental damage, or is committed in the 
framework of a criminal organisation (article 7(2)(b) Proposal). 
• a maximum of at least between EUR 750,000 and EUR 1,500,000 in cases where the offence 
is committed intentionally and causes the death of or serious injury to a person (article 7(2)(c) 
Proposal). 
Within these limits, the Proposal also allowed Member States the adjust and fine-tune any fines in 
accordance with specific criteria, such as the turnover of the legal person, the financial advantage 
achieved or envisaged by the commission of the offence, or any other value indicating the financial 
situation of the legal person (article 7(2) Proposal. Also here, these fines could be complemented with 
additional sanctions or measures, ranging from the obligation to reinstate the environment, the 
exclusion from entitlement to public benefits, the disqualification from industrial or commercial 
                                                             
97 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of the environment through criminal law. COM(2007) 51 final. Brussels, 9 February 2007 (hereinafter, 
the Proposal). 
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activities, the placing under judicial supervision or  winding-up order, the obligation to adopt specific 
measures to eliminate the consequences of the penalised conduct, or the publication of the judicial 
decision and the associated sanctions and measures (article 7(4) Proposal). 
Indicative as these proposals may be, however, the Commission eventually dropped them after the 
CJEU´s judgment in C-440/05. Instead, the ECD gives Member States ample leeway for setting up a 
system of criminal penalties with the mere requirement of being ‘effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive’. Admittedly, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the introcution of the new article 
83 TFEU open up an opportunity for a revision of the ECD that may also deal with criminal sanctions. 
In their contribution to the conclusions of the EFFACE Research Project,98 however, Faure and 
Philipsen strongly advised against a EU-wide harmonisation of criminal sanctions for environmental 
offences, akin to that originally included in the 2007 Proposal. Such an approach is dismissed as 
possibly too rigid, and thus ineffective. Instead, a soft new governance type of mechanism is suggested 
by which prosecutors and judges from across the EU exchange best practices, set benchmarks and 
engage in an open method of coordination for a ‘bottom-up-harmonisation,99 as already done to a 
limited extent through the European Network of Prosecutors for the Environment (ENPE).100 
4.2 Prosecution and sentencing of environmental crimes under UK and Scottish law 
All environmental offence prosecutions are taken by COPFS101, almost always after referral from SEPA. 
The capacity of COPFS to deal more effectively with environmental offences has been enhanced since 
2013 when a specialist prosecution unit, the Wildlife and Environmental Crime Unit, was established 
within it to address perceived lack of expertise amongst prosecutors due to the separation of 
enforcement and prosecution powers102 and the increasing complexity of environmental and wildlife 
offences.103 
The decision as to whether or not to proceed with an environmental or wildlife criminal prosecution 
lies entirely within the discretion of COPFS and will depend on its assessment of whether there is both 
sufficient admissible, reliable evidence and sufficient public interest in proceeding.104 The prosecution 
is also the ‘master of the instance’ and therefore decides whether to proceed by way of summary 
proceedings105 or solemn proceedings.106 There is no right to trial by jury on request. 
Mirroring the brief overview of environmental offences in UK and Scottish law, this subsection will 
provide a matching overview of available sentences for those conducts. Against this background, the 
section then turns to critically discuss the practice of prosecuting and sentencing of environmental 
crimes in the UK and Scotland. 
4.2.1 Waste 
A person who commits an offence under s33 shall be liable: 
                                                             
98 EFFACE – European Union Action to Fight Environmental Crime. See <efface.eu>, accessed on 1 July 2018. 
99 Michel Faure and Niels Philipsen, ‘Contribution to Conclusions and Recommendations on Environmental 
Crime: System of Sanctions’ (2016) 13. 
100 CM Billiet and others, ‘Sanctioning Environmental Crime (WG4) - Prosecution and Judicial Practices 2016/17’ 
(2018). 
101 Unlike England and Wales, where the Environment Agency has power to directly bring prosecutions. 
102 Fasoli (n 19), 254. 
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104 Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service Prosecution Code 2001. 
105 Before a sheriff but without a jury in the Sheriff Court. 
106 Before a judge and jury, either in the Sheriff Court or the High Court of Justiciary. 
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(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not 
exceeding £40,000 or both; and 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine or 
both. If the offence is in relation to special waste107 the person is liable to the same sentences except 
that the imprisonment term is five years. 
If the offence is in relation to household waste from a domestic property within the curtilage of the 
dwelling the person is liable: 
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine not 
exceeding the statutory maximum108 or both; 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine or 
both. 
Another of the principal provisions regulating waste is s34 of the EPA 1990 which imposes a duty of 
care on any person109 who imports, produces, keeps or manages controlled waste or otherwise has 
control of such waste, to ensure prevention of another from breaching s33 or an environmental 
permit; to prevent the escape of waste; to transfer adequately described waste only to an authorised 
person and to take reasonable measures to apply the waste hierarchy.110 It is an offence under s34 (6) 
to breach the duty of care without reasonable excuse. 
A person who commits an offence under s34 shall be liable on summary conviction, to a fine not 
exceeding the statutory maximum; and on conviction on indictment, to a fine. 
4.2.2 Water 
A person guilty of an offence under regulation 44(1) is liable: 
(a) on summary conviction— 
(i) to a fine not exceeding £40,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to 
both; and 
(ii) in the case of a continuing offence, to a further fine not exceeding £250 for every day during 
which the offence is continued after conviction; 
(b) on conviction on indictment— 
(i) to a fine or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years, or to both; and 
(ii) in the case of a continuing offence to a further fine not exceeding £1,000 for every day during 
which the offence is continued after conviction. 
                                                             
107 Under s62 of the EPA 1995, special waste is controlled waste of any kind that is or may be so dangerous or 
difficult to treat, keep or dispose of that special provision is required for dealing with it. 
108 £10,000 under the Criminal Proceedings etc. (Reform) (Scotland) Act 2007 sections 47 and 48. 
109 The domestic householder is exempt from almost all aspects of the duty- EPA 1990 s34 (2). 
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Directives [2008] OJ L 312/3. 
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Additionally, under regulation 49, the court may, in addition to, or instead of, imposing any 
punishment, order a person convicted of a principal offence to take such steps as may be specified in 
that order for remedying those matters. 
4.2.3 Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control 
A person guilty of an offence under regulation 67, paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (d), (f), (fa) or 
(j) is liable: 
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding £40,000 or to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding twelve months, or to both, 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or 
to both. 
A person guilty of an offence under regulation 67, paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs (c), (e), (g), (h), (i) or 
(k) is liable: 
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or 
to both. 
Additionally, under regulation 70, the court may, in addition to, or instead of, imposing any 
punishment, order a person convicted of an offence under regulation 67 (1) (a), (b) or (d) to take such 
steps as may be specified in that order for remedying those matters. 
4.2.4 Regulatory Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 s40 
A person who commits an offence under s40 (1) is liable: 
 (a)  on summary conviction to— (i) a fine not exceeding £40,000, (ii) imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 12 months, or (iii) both, 
 (b)  on conviction on indictment to— (i) a fine, (ii) imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years, 
or (iii) both. 
4.3 Practice of environmental crime sentencing in Scotland 
One of the defining characteristics of the enforcement of environmental regulation in the UK and 
Scotland is that its principal aim is to prevent harm to the environment or human health, rather than 
to detect and punish those who cause such harm, though the latter is obviously still an important 
aim.111 Therefore supporting, educating and advising those regulated is a major part of the work of 
regulators, with detection, punishment and deterrence of those causing harm forming a relatively 
small proportion of regulators’ activities.112 The criminal law, in turn, is only a part of that detection, 
punishment and deterrence effort. This approach, termed ‘responsive regulation’ by Ayres and 
Braithwaite113, is an amalgam of the approaches at either end of the enforcement spectrum; an almost 
wholly persuasive approach to compliance by the regulator and an almost wholly punitive approach, 
                                                             
111 Bell and others (n 79) 284. 
112The enforcement outcomes SEPA seeks to achieve are; to secure compliance with regulatory requirements 
designed to protect and improve the environment and bring the activity under regulatory control and stop 
offending; to remove financial benefits arising from illegal activity; to stop harm or reduce the risk of harm to an 
acceptable level; to restore or remediate the harm caused by non-compliance, where appropriate; to deter 
future non-compliance and re-offending. SEPA-Guidance on the use of enforcement action- June 2016 
113 Ayres and Braithwaite (n 29). 
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relying mostly on criminal prosecution. ‘Responsive regulation’ entails using mechanisms of increasing 
formality and impact, in proportion to the extent that the regulated fail to meet their legal obligations. 
This approach can be described as forming an ‘enforcement pyramid’114, with most of those regulated 
complying with regulation and a progressively smaller number requiring the application of increasingly 
punitive measures to obtain compliance.115 
Our effort ranges from providing advice and guidance to help improve compliance, to taking formal 
enforcement action, such as issuing enforcement notices and final warning letters. We believe 
regulation is about changing behaviour, to help achieve positive outcomes for the environment, 
society and the economy. As we know that one approach does not fit all circumstances, the form of 
action we take to secure compliance will differ depending on the particular nature of the non-
compliance, the harm caused and the history of the responsible person in question. We recognise 
that most of those we regulate respond to our advice and guidance, and many businesses are 
recognising the benefit of demonstrating good environmental compliance. As such, there will be 
many occasions where providing advice and guidance is the appropriate level of action we need to 
take to secure compliance and change behaviour.   SEPA Enforcement Report 2016/17 
The significance of three aspects of environmental regulation is important in understanding 
‘responsive regulation’. The first is society’s ambivalent attitude to environmental harms generally. A 
great deal of everyday activities regularly carried out by most of the population cause environmental 
harm. At a high level, the burning of fossil fuels is both not only polluting and unsustainable in the long 
term but also essential to the economic and social structure of almost every nation on earth. The 
environmental damage inherent in the use of, inter alia, cars, aircraft, cement, plastics and a way of 
life predicated on globalised trade, increased economic growth and consumption is often tolerated 
and, in many cases, encouraged by society at large. The role of modern environmental regulation, 
since its very inception in the 19th century has therefore been to mitigate the effects of most 
environmental damage, not to eliminate them, and the tension between economic activity and 
environmental regulation has existed since then.116  In essence, environmental harm is accepted by 
society at large up to a point and it is going beyond that point which constitutes non-compliance; in 
some ways, therefore, the definition of at least some environmental offences is a question of degree117 
and so, especially in less egregious instances of environmental damage, pleas in mitigation that 
highlight the allegedly unfair restrictions on business imposed by environmental criminal law may well 
strike a chord with courts, contributing to more lenient eventual sentences.118 
The second aspect flows from the first: the basis of modern regulation is the issuing of licenses to 
regulate potentially damaging operations, non-possession of which or breach of the terms of which 
                                                             
114 ibid 35–8. 
115 Bell and others (n 79) 285. 
116 s4 of the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876 laid out both the offence and the defence: ‘Every person who 
causes to fall or flow or knowingly permits to fall or flow or to be carried into any stream any poisonous, noxious, 
or polluting liquid proceeding from any factory or manufacturing process shall… be deemed to have committed 
an offence against this Act. Where any such poisonous, noxious, or polluting liquid as aforesaid falls or flows or 
is carried into any stream… the person causing or knowingly permitting the poisonous, noxious, or polluting 
liquid so to fall or flow or to be carried shall not be deemed to have committed an offence against this Act if he 
shows to the satisfaction of the court… that he is using the best practicable and reasonably available means to 
render harmless the poisonous, noxious, or polluting liquid so falling or flowing or carried into the stream.’ 
117 For example, regulation 3 (g) of The Water Environment (Controlled Activities) (Scotland) Regulations 2011, 
extends the effect of the Regulations to ‘any other activity which directly or indirectly has or is likely to have a 
significant adverse impact on the water environment’. (Emphasis added.) 
118 De Prez (n 66) 6. 
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constitute a frequent source of non-compliance.119 In cases of non-possession or breach of the terms 
of licences, the regulator has significant discretion in terms of what action to take. Actions available 
to SEPA to address a breach of licence conditions can include advice and guidance, accepting voluntary 
enforcement undertakings, Fixed Monetary Penalties120, statutory notices121, final warning letters and 
referral of suspected criminal offences to the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service. Licence 
conditions are therefore the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the regulatory process and a significant proportion of 
offences are related to breaches of such conditions.122 The evidence and factual issues which come 
before the courts in these cases can be highly technical and the difficulties this poses for triers of fact 
have been argued by some to contribute to lenient sentencing for environmental offences.123 
Thirdly, the inherently close relationship between regulator and regulated in ‘responsive regulation’ 
is potentially problematic. It was George Stigler in the 1970s who first developed ‘capture theory’ as 
a way of explaining a tendency in certain close regulatory relationships for the regulator to uphold the 
interests of the regulated at the expense of the public interest.124 The area of environmental 
regulation is potentially ripe for capture to occur: regulators are in regular close contact with regulated 
industries, many of which are vigorous campaigners for their interests, while contact with perhaps 
equally committed campaigners for stricter  environmental regulation is less frequent and less integral 
to their work; experience of industrial processes can be the ideal background for an enforcement 
officer and vice versa, so ‘job switching’ and blurring of loyalties is likely and socio-economic 
commonalities between regulators and regulated, with the latter not usually conforming to the 
‘criminal’ stereotype, contribute to further blurring.125 
The presence together in the regulatory system of aspects of a purely persuasive approach, a 
persuasive approach backed by administrative action, a civil-based punitive approach and a criminal-
based punitive approach creates a pattern of environmental offences whereby only the worst 
offences, in the view of the regulator, are recommended for prosecution. SEPA’s 2016-17 Enforcement 
Report makes their position clear- 
 ‘Whilst we have the ability to refer all offences to COPFS, this option will generally be reserved for 
offences that are most serious or where there is evidence of wider criminality’.126 
                                                             
119 Possession of a licence/permit and adherence to its terms is an implicit defence to many environmental 
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120 Provided for by The Environmental Regulation (Enforcement Measures) (Scotland) Order 2015 and currently 
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One would expect, then, that the sentences for environmental offences that result in prosecution 
would be towards the top end of the available range, but this is not always the case. (See Tables 1 and 
2 below) A significant recent development is that SEPA are currently rolling out the introduction of 
their new civil enforcement measures127, which include fixed monetary penalties (FMP); enforcement 
undertakings (EU); variable monetary penalties (VMP) and VMP undertakings. (Together known as 
‘enforcement measures’). The full implementation of these measures may well have the effect of 
lowering still further the number of cases referred to COPFS, the number of prosecutions initiated and 
the number of eventual convictions. 
One of these measures, the agreement of an Enforcement Undertaking, results from an offer, made 
voluntarily by a person in non-compliance and formally accepted by SEPA, to make financial amends 
for non-compliance and its effects and to prevent recurrence. SEPA encourages offers to include 
actions that demonstrate preventative longer-term actions.  An Enforcement Undertaking provides an 
opportunity, primarily to otherwise compliant people or businesses, to remedy non-compliance. SEPA 
has to have reasonable grounds to suspect that a relevant offence has been committed. The 
responsible person voluntarily offers SEPA a solution to non-compliance. 128 Enforcement 
undertakings were rolled out in 2017/18 and five undertakings were accepted, entailing financial 
contribution by the non-compliant persons of £9,000, £14,000, £15,000, £31,869 and £280,000.129 
Though the numbers are very small and therefore impossible to statistically analyse, it may be that 
the introduction of Enforcement Undertakings in 2017/18 contributed to the reduction in convictions 
in that year.  
Another potentially significant enforcement measure is the Variable Monetary Penalty, not yet rolled 
out but currently planned to range from £200 to £40,000. This measure enables SEPA to impose a 
variable monetary penalty on persons whom it is satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, have 
committed a ‘relevant offence’. If implemented as currently planned, VMPs are therefore likely to 
reinforce the current policy position that only the most serious alleged offences are recommended for 
prosecution. However, assuming that only less serious breaches130 will be sanctioned using VMPs, 
serious discontinuities could arise between sanctions imposed under the VMP regime and the criminal 
prosecution regime. The former ranges between £200 and £40,000 and, while unlimited fines are 
possible in solemn cases, the median131 financial penalty132 imposed by the criminal courts133 in 
Scotland each year for the past five years beginning with 2013/14 have been £9,875, £6,575, £8,000, 
£3,000 and £9,750.134 See Table 1 below. 
                                                             
 127 Under the Environmental Regulation (Enforcement Measures) (Scotland) Order 2015 SSI 2015/383. 
128 Scottish Environment Protection Agency, ‘Guidance on the Use of Enforcement Action. June 2016’ (2016). 
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Table 1: Financial Penalties for Environmental Offences 
















































Source: SEPA Enforcement Reports 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17 and SEPA Chief Executive bi-monthly Reports 
during 2016, 2017 and 2018.  
 
In terms of absolute numbers, the incidence of breaches of environmental regulation in Scotland is 
low, due at least partly to the size of the jurisdiction. Given the ‘Responsive Regulation’ model pursued 
by the regulator, the absolute number of criminal prosecutions and resulting convictions for 
environmental crimes are correspondingly low. 
In 2016-17, eighteen criminal convictions were secured following recommendations from SEPA to 
prosecute,135 of which six were under the waste regime and five under the water regime, with one or 
two convictions each under other regimes such as PPC. In 2015-16, the corresponding figures were 
eleven convictions, with six under the waste regime and one or two convictions each under other 
regimes. In 2014-15, there were nineteen convictions, with eleven under the waste regime and seven 
under the water regime.136 A breakdown of the sentences imposed is in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2: Sentences for Environmental Offences 
 
 
During the period 2013-14 to 2017-18 two people received custodial sentences.137  One person 
received a custodial sentence of 9 months and 14 months to run concurrently and the other person a 
custodial sentence of six months. Restriction of liberty orders have also been used during this period 
with three people receiving restriction of liberty orders of four, six and eight months respectively. 
There were no reported convictions for the offence of causing serious environmental harm under the 
Regulatory Reform Scotland Act 2014 s40 since it came into force in June 2014. 
                                                             
137 Under the provisions of s245A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. 
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^ SEPA Enforcement Report 2016-17 reports 16 cases resulting in convictions.  One case resulted in 
two fines of £300, and another case which resulted in two people receiving community payback 
orders.  These two cases have been reported as four criminal convictions in the table above. 
Source: SEPA Enforcement Reports 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17.  * Data taken from both 
SEPA Enforcement Report 2016-17 and Chief Executive of SEPA bi-monthly Reports. (2016, 2017, and 
2018). 
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It is difficult to discern a trend in values of financial penalties.  The number of offences in each year 
where a financial penalty has been imposed varies from four to sixteen making meaningful 
interpretation extremely difficult. 
There have been longstanding criticisms of what is perceived by many as unduly lenient sentences for 
environmental offences in Scotland. While arguably prosecution has been rendered more effective by 
the establishment of the Wildlife and Environmental Crime Unit within COPFS, “where the use of 
criminal law arguably falls down is in the penalties imposed by the courts which have been criticised 
as not providing a sufficient deterrent”.138 The perception is supported by regular reporting by SEPA 
in its Enforcement Reports139 of the consistently higher level of fines in England, fine levels which 
themselves have been criticised in that jurisdiction.  
It is worth noting that there have been a number of particularly large financial penalties not included 
in the table above. 
 In 2010, ExxonMobil received a £2,770,000 civil penalty under the The Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Trading Scheme Regulations 2005 for failing to report all greenhouse gases emissions from its Fife 
ethylene plant in 2008. In SEPA’s view, the failure to report accurately which gave rise to the penalty 
was an inadvertent error and had no direct environmental impact, unlike cases for which SEPA would 
seek prosecution and publicity. ExxonMobil had under-reported 32,966 tons of CO2 emissions and the 
2005 regulations empower regulators to impose a levy of €100 per tonne of emissions not covered by 
allowances or offsets. This remains the largest sum ever levied for an environmental breach in the 
UK.140 
There were two cases against the same haulage and waste disposal company and its officers of serious 
breaches of s33 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 in 2011 and 2014. In 2011, the company 
pled guilty in the Sheriff Court to disposing of controlled waste in a manner likely to pollute the 
environment or harm human health, an offence under section 33(1)(c) of the 1990 Act and was fined 
£8,000. The Lord Advocate appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal on the grounds that the sentence 
was unduly lenient, given the ability of the company to pay a much higher fine. The court upheld the 
appeal, quashing the original fine and imposing a substitute fine of £90,000. 
The court also focussed on the seriousness of the offence and the company’s previous record.  Lord 
Clark said- "The conduct in question took place over a period of time and involved a blatant and 
complacent disregard by the respondents of their responsibilities. That the site in question was in 
nearby proximity to a residential area compounded the seriousness of the situation. The offence with 
which we are dealing, has also to be set against a number of analogous previous offences, three of 
them recent, where fines were imposed on the respondents, which clearly did not have the deterrent 
effect that is required".141 The case was seen by commentators as potentially a landmark in Scottish 
environmental criminal law. Parpworth and Thompson wrote “It is, of course, far too early to 
determine whether (the case) will come to be seen as a landmark decision in relation to sentencing 
for environmental offences. To date, there has not been an appeal case in which the decision has 
received judicial consideration. Nevertheless, when that occasion does arise, as it undoubtedly will, it 
seems likely that the approach to sentencing which the Appeal Court’s decision advocates will be 
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endorsed, especially since it reflects a greater willingness on the part of the authorities in Scotland to 
get tough with those who commit environmental crimes.”142 
The next appeal case was an appeal by the same company against a fine of £200,000 and a community 
payback order of 250 hours for a company officer, imposed by the Sheriff Court for a s33 offence.143 
The appeal was refused, Lord Bracadale saying- “In our opinion this offence represented a serious 
breach of the 1990 Act. The evidence before the sheriff made it clear that this was a large-scale 
operation driven by a desire to make profit. The evidence indicated that the products of the waste 
would be likely to find their way into the surrounding land and groundwater causing harm to the 
environment. The company had a significant record of analogous convictions. The most recent 
conviction was of a particularly serious nature……… In all the circumstances we were unable to say 
that the sentence imposed was excessive and we refused the appeal against sentence.”144 
4.4 Environmental offenders 
A practical, operational definition of environmental crime, as an action or omission that directly or 
indirectly causes harm or poses a risk of harm to the environmental and which is prohibited and 
punishable by the criminal law,145 can be relatively easily sketched but environmental criminals are 
less easily characterised. 
 The two most common serious environmental crimes in Scotland are breaches of the waste regime 
and the water regime and it has been argued that offenders perpetrating each of these crimes may 
have a different mens rea146 and that this and other factors play a part in the attitudes of regulators 
and courts to them. Parpworth and Thompson147 have characterised many serious waste offences as 
involving something more than a failure to comply with the conditions of a permit. Instead, those who 
commit them may be seeking to operate entirely outside a regulatory regime, thus avoiding the 
strictures of a licence or permit and the costs associated with compliance.  They argue that, in these 
cases, the conduct involved may be said to be truly “criminal”.148  Such conduct is not inadvertent or 
accidental or even negligent, instead representing a deliberate attempt to flout the law.  Commercial-
scale fly tipping, where it relates to the unregulated, large-scale dumping of waste149 by persons who 
have been paid to legally dispose of the material in their capacity as a waste collection business is a 
prime example. They argue that the deceit involved, the profits made and the potentially harmful 
consequences to the environment, makes those who commit such offences fully deserving of the most 
severe punishments, including imprisonment.  
Watson argues that companies often have strong economic incentives to break the law. Illegal 
activities often make good business sense. The assumption behind this is that firms are rational 
economic actors. Accordingly, businesses generally pursue activities which are likely to lead to 
economic gains and avoid those which may lead to losses. A business may therefore be tempted to 
pollute the environment if the expected gain (increased profit or investment postponed) is greater 
                                                             
142 Neil Parpworth and Katharine Thompson, ‘Environmental Offences: Making the Punishment Fit the Crime’ 
[2012] Juridical Review 69. 
143 This sentence does not appear in the table above as the table does not provide data for 2013-14.  
144 Doonin Plant v HMA [2014] HCJAC 26; 2014 J.C. 207 at [19] 
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than the anticipated loss (fine, confiscation or civil penalty). The likelihood of conviction is an 
important factor in Watson’s view. If the probability of prosecution is small, the likely sentence would 
have to be very substantial to function as an effective deterrent, otherwise the risk of a financial 
penalty could simply be regarded as one of the unavoidable costs of doing business150 
In contrast, serious water regime contraventions, typically releases of silage or manure/slurry effluent 
by agriculture or release of waste water effluent by Scottish Water may be more easily characterised 
as inadvertent, careless or negligent. However, while there is no obvious immediate financial gain to 
be made by committing these offences, the financial gain may well be indirect, related to attempts to 
contain operating costs or postponement of investment decisions regarding infrastructure or process 
improvements.151 
The adversarial nature of the criminal justice system, especially the plea in mitigation before 
sentencing, also brings out some of the issues inherent in environmental crime. De Prez152 argues that 
since the majority of environmental offences do not require the prosecution to prove mens rea, this 
strict liability acts as a cloak for many accused, leaving defence counsel plenty of room to deny 
culpability in order to mitigate the offence. This strategy often takes the form of trivialising the 
offence, blaming misfortune and third parties for the offence or asserting that, given that the offence 
was not deliberate, enforcement was an unreasonable restriction on the right to trade; all drawing on 
preconceptions of environmental crime as not being real crime and that the balance between 
encouraging economic development and protection of the environment has swung too far in favour 
of the latter. 
Adshead develops the same themes; she acknowledges that the seriousness of environmental damage 
is reflected in the high upper limits for fine and sentence in the courts but that lay judges and members 
of the professional judiciary who do not subscribe to the view that environmental crime is serious and 
continue to distinguish environmental offences from the activities of ‘true criminality’ will not consider 
high penalties to be appropriate. In her view, the strict liability nature of the offences, coupled with 
the particular approach to causation in environmental cases153 and accompanying arguments in 
mitigation from the defence, may also influence the courts in their sentencing.154  
There has also been criticism in the past of the double exercise of discretion inherent in the process 
whereby SEPA gathers evidence and, in exercise of its discretion, decides to refer the case to COPFS 
for prosecution, whereupon COPFS undertakes a second, and definitive, exercise of discretion as to 
whether or not to proceed.155 Arguably, however, the same process also applies to all other crimes, 
only then the police exercise the initial discretion rather than SEPA. Inherent concerns about the 
regulator’s ability to gather usable evidence and prosecutors’ ability to deal with often highly technical 
legislation may have been addressed in the interim by the formation of SEPA and of COPFS’s Wildlife 
and Environmental Crime Unit. However, the nature of the relationship between regulator and 
regulated in the context of ‘responsive regulation’ is very different to that between police and 
suspects of ‘mainstream’ crime; there is little scope for advice and guidance to offenders or potential 
offenders or for the creation of a positive relationship between the police and a person who has or is 
about to breach the law. If indeed there still is increased scope for discretion in the approach to 
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environmental crime compared to others, both regulator and regulated, at least, may view that as 
constructive. 
There has long been a body of opinion that claimed that perceived low sentences for environmental 
(and wildlife) crimes could at least partly be addressed by the creation of a specialist environmental 
court in Scotland, with a criminal jurisdiction. The main driver for this view (held in England too)156 
was that the small number of such cases coming before the ordinary criminal courts meant that the 
judiciary were unable to build up both expertise in the technicalities of the offences and a firm grasp 
of the seriousness of the harms perpetrated by these crimes. Adshead has written that lay magistrates 
encounter barely any cases of environmental crime, amongst their routine business. Furthermore, 
environmental cases can also be extremely complex and technical, often involving evidential material 
on industrial processes, pollutants and pathways, which, together with their unfamiliarity, cause 
problems for magistrates.157 
However, in response to its Developments in Environmental Justice in Scotland Consultation158, the 
Scottish Government announced that it would not be taking forward the idea of a specialist 
environmental and wildlife court. The main reason advanced for the decision was that the numbers 
of wildlife and environmental crime cases prosecuted in the courts is relatively small compared to 
crimes such as theft or drug offences so that the number of wildlife or environmental crime cases 
would not sustain a specialist criminal environmental court. It was also felt that most cases are best 
heard in a local sheriff court rather than a centralised specialist court, a view which has also received 
support from commentators concerned that such a move “may give the public and the press the 
wrong impression that they are not real crimes”159, once again raising the issue of the extent to which 
environmental and wildlife crimes are mala in se. 
4.5 Statistical data on environmental prosecutions in England and Wales 
In England and Wales, the sentencing of the criminal convictions secured for environmental offences 
has long been criticised for perceived lack of severity by politicians, academics and environmental 
enforcement practitioners. 
The Lord Chancellor160, Lord Irvine, in a speech to magistrates in 1998, said: 'I will not try to hide that 
there is disquiet in some quarters about the level of sentences which are given by courts in response 
to environmental offences. The sentences magistrates and judges hand down for damage to the 
environment should reflect the seriousness of the offences.’161 
The Environment Agency has also been clear regarding its concerns about the levels of fines for 
environmental offences in England and Wales. In 2001, the then Agency Chairperson said that, "fines 
will need to substantially increase for businesses to understand the environment’s true value", and 
that, "the current scale of penalties levied by the courts makes pollution an acceptable risk".162 There 
was also parliamentary support for this view. The House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee 
has stated: "We recommend that the general level at which fines are imposed neither reflects the 
gravity of environmental crimes, nor deters or punishes adequately those who commit them. This is 
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clearly unsatisfactory."163 Rosalind Malcolm in 2002 felt that ‘The low level of sentences encountered 
in many cases concerned with pollution law… has become something of a notoriety.’164 
Despite this, sentences for environmental crimes in England and Wales have traditionally been 
regarded as more punitive and therefore more appropriate than those in Scotland. Successive SEPA 
Enforcement Reports have made the point, albeit implicitly, by simply reproducing the figures. The 
figures are as follows: 
 Scotland England 
Average criminal fine 2015-16 £7,600 £44,546 
2014-15 £20,314 £18,078 
2013-14 £10,965 £10,254 
2012-13 £16,188 £7,801 
2011-12 £5,926 £9,336 
 
The 2016/17 SEPA Enforcement Report said, in connection with the English 2015/16 figures 
particularly, ‘[i]n relation to the dramatic increase in the average level of fines in England, the 
Environmental Offences Definitive Guideline was introduced by the English Sentencing Council and 
took effect from 1 July 2014.  The prediction at the time these guidelines were introduced, that they 
would be likely to result in larger fines for serious offences, appears borne out…’ 
SEPA, of course, pointed out the differences between themselves and the Environment Agency in 
terms of prosecution process and applicable substantive law. But other factors may operate more 
decisively to make the differences appear less than they are. For example, because the figures are 
based on small numbers of convictions in Scotland and furthermore are expressed as averages 
sensitive to distortion by single values, the two large fines successively imposed on the one company 
in Scotland in 2011 and 2014 would have had a disproportionate inflationary effect on the Scottish 
averages in whichever year they were reported as falling in. On the other hand, the effect of a small 
sample, especially on the Scottish side and the use of averages, rather than medians, could also have 
had an effect in the other direction. In short, it is not possible to subject these values to the kind of 
statistical analysis which would allow robust conclusions to be drawn. 
Similar difficulties may have affected the assessment of sentence levels in England and Wales 
generally. While the perceived leniency of environmental sentences in that jurisdiction was a 
commonplace view, Parpworth points to the lack of reliable data to substantiate the view165 and that, 
even in the larger jurisdiction of England and Wales, annual mean fine amounts can be distorted by 
the imposition of a few large fines in a particular year. 
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Year Mean Median 
2001 £3,412 £2,500 
2002 £3,999 £2,250 
2003 £4,184 £2,000 
2004 £4,245 £2,500 
2005 £3,953 £2,000 
2006 £4,313 £3,000 
2007 £4,219 £2,000 
2008 £5,198 £2,000 
2009 £2,737 £1,500 
2010 £3,445 £2,000 
2011 £6,259 £1,500 
Average fine amount11 Not adjusted for price level (inflation) 




The table, published by the Sentencing Council in England and Wales in 2013, shows that the mean 
figure remained relatively stable between 2001–2007, where it consistently stood in the £3,000-
£4,500 range. However, it became rather more erratic between 2008–2011 so that whereas in 2008 
it stood at over £5,000, in 2009 it fell to below £3,000. By 2011 it had risen to a level not seen in any 
of the previous 10 years, i.e. in excess of £6,000. The median figures for environmental offences 
between 2001–2011 are confined to a narrow range. Nevertheless, they do seem to exhibit an overall 
"downward trend" from £2,500 in 2001 to £1,500 in 2011166 and, even if inflation was taken into 
account, can only be said to be stable, at most. 
Another factor contributing to the perception of lenient fines in England and Wales over the period 
2000-2010, and arguably evidence in itself that environmental offences were not taken seriously, was 
the fact that in a number of high profile cases, fines imposed at first instance had been substantially 
reduced on appeal e.g. R. v. Milford Haven Port Authority (The Sea Empress)167, where a fine of £4 
million was reduced to £750,000 on appeal, R. v Anglian Water Services Ltd168, where a £200,000 fine 
was reduced to £60,000, and R. v Cemex Cement Ltd169, where the Court of Appeal reduced a fine of 
£400,000 to £50,000.170 
Two recent initiatives attempted to address the perceived leniency of sentences for environmental 
crimes in England.171 The first was that the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 gave the 
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Environment Agency a range of new powers in certain situations to impose civil sanctions, depending 
on the circumstances of the offence, similar to the powers SEPA is currently rolling out under the 
Regulatory Reform (Scotland) Act 2014. 
The second was the publication in 2014 of the Sentencing Council’s Environmental Offences Definitive 
Guideline for the most serious environmental offences in England and Wales.172 The Guideline sets 
out a structured approach to sentences for “organisations”173 and for individuals convicted of the 
relevant environmental offences. The Guideline’s basis is the assessment of the category of offence, 
which is done using a scale of both culpability and harm factors. 
 The culpability factors range from Deliberate, to Reckless, to Negligent, to finally, Low or no 
culpability. The harm factors range from Category 1, the most serious environmental damage, having 
“major” effects, down to Category 4 which is the risk (but not manifestation) of Category 3 harm, 
which is “minor” or “limited” effects on the environment. Combining the two sets of factors enables 
the offence category to be determined. Since there are four culpability categories and four harm 
categories, there are 16 potential combinations of offence category. At one end of the sentencing 
spectrum is the category 1 offence which is adjudged to be Deliberate, while at the other, the category 
4 offence which involves either Low or no culpability. For organisation, these offence categories are 
then applied to four different sizes of entity, ranging from Large to Medium, Small and Micro. This 
provides 64 offence category/entity size bands ranging from a large entity that has committed a 
Deliberate category 1 offence to a micro entity that has committed a Low/no culpability category 4 
offence. Finally, each one of these 64 bands is allocated a starting point fine and a fine range. So, for 
a large entity that has committed a Deliberate category 1 offence the starting point is a fine of 
£1,000,000 and the range £450,000 to £3,000,000 and for a micro entity that has committed a Low/no 
culpability category 4 offence the starting point is a fine of £200 and the range £100 to £700. 
The methodology for individuals is the same in respect of offence category but has no entity size 
component. Unlike the methodology for organisations, however, that for individuals allows for 
custodial and other disposals which are not applicable to organisations. Therefore, a Deliberate 
category 1 offence has a starting point of 18 months’ custody and a range of 1-3 years’ custody, 
whereas a Low/no culpability category 4 offence has a starting point of a Band A fine174 and a range 
between a Conditional Discharge and a Band A fine. 
Two points about the Guideline are worthy of note. Firstly, a point made before, that the Guideline 
uses factors such as culpability and a differentiation between actual harm and risk of harm that are 
not generally relevant to questions of guilt but are of relevance to pleas in mitigation and sentencing 
decisions. 
 Secondly, the Guideline makes no detailed provision for very large organisations i.e. those with a 
turnover in excess of £50 million, except to say that, in their case, “it may be necessary to move outside 
the suggested range to achieve a proportionate sentence”.175 Many multi-national companies and 
domestic utilities will have turnovers in excess of £50 million and, in the event of the company making 
correspondingly high profits and being guilty of a serious environmental offence, the Guidelines are 
of little assistance. This occurred in R v Thames Water176 in 2015, just after the introduction of the 
Guideline, when the utility pled guilty to a negligent category 3 offence, for which the fine starting 
point for a large company in the Guideline was £60,000. In the absence of assistance from the 
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Guideline, the judge at first instance multiplied the £60,000 by five, based on the utility’s turnover 
and, after discounts for mitigation and early plea, fined Thames Water £250,000 plus victim surcharge 
and approximately £7000 costs. Thames Water appealed and the appeal was refused in robust 
fashion. Focussing on the word “may” (in contra-distinction to the word “will”) in the above quote 
from the Guideline regarding very large companies, the Appeal Court held the Guidelines did not apply 
to very large companies and rejected extrapolations from the Guideline as an appropriate approach 
in cases such as these. In refusing the appeal, the court held that the sentence of £250,000 was lenient 
and the court 'would have had no hesitation in upholding a very substantially higher fine'177, 
suggesting that in cases of very large repeat offenders (which Thames Water were) ‘fines measured in 
millions of pounds’178 may result.179 
The consensus in the recent literature appears to be that the Guideline has had an effect of increasing 
the levels of fines imposed upon companies in England. Burton writes of a “revolution in sentencing 
for environmental crime brought about by the combination of shifting judicial attitudes and the 
Sentencing Guideline”180 and that R v Thames Water “should have sent a chill through the boardrooms 
of all high-turnover companies holding environmental permits”.181 Parpworth observes that “the 
Guideline has had an immediate and significant impact on the sentencing of corporate offenders”182 
because whereas in the six months immediately prior to its implementation, the average fine was 
£8,800 and the median was £3,500, in the six months after implementation, the mean and median 
fines increased considerably to £42,700 and £11,200, respectively.183 
However, the Guideline seems to have had little discernible impact upon either mean fine levels for 
individual offenders, or the median level of fines. Thus, during the period 2005–2015, the mean fine 
achieved a highpoint of £1,200 in 2005 and a low point of £590 in 2009. For 2015, it stood at £670 
which represented a marginal increase (£40) on the previous year.184  
Despite the signs of an effect on the sentences for organisations, the caveats regarding small datasets, 
even in England, still apply and the Sentencing Council itself recognises the “relative paucity”185 of 
sentencing data for environmental offences. 
5. Wildlife offences in historical perspective 
The Biblical notion that non-human animals existed for the use of humans pervaded attitudes towards 
all animals, wild and non-wild, well into the 1800s in Scotland, England and all other countries where 
the Christian faith influenced societal values.186 The Enlightenment, which changed so much else, had 
little impact on this view; Rene Descartes (1596-1650) held that non-humans were automata that did 
not possess souls, minds, or the ability to reason. As such, non-humans could not suffer or feel pain.187 
John Locke (1632-1704) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) conceded that cruelty to animals was morally 
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wrong but only because of its effect on human morality. Kant said that ‘he who is cruel to animals 
becomes hard also in his dealing with men’.188  
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) began the move towards contemporary thinking about animals in 
philosophy and law.  
The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could 
have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny… What else is it that should trace the 
insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps, the faculty for discourse?…  the question is 
not, can they reason? nor, can they talk? but, can they suffer?189  
Bentham’s view that humans have a responsibility to ensure animals do not experience unnecessary 
suffering continues to be a foundational principle of animal protection law. Bentham ensured that the 
issue of animal protection would no longer be seen from a solely anthropomorphic point of view but 
also (at least partly) from a biocentric190 one which considered the protection of animals for their own 
sake because of their inherent value. 
The Cruel Treatment of Cattle Act 1822 was the first animal protection statute in the UK (and the 
world) followed by the Cruelty to Animals Act 1849 and the Protection of Animals (Scotland) Act 1912. 
This, and subsequent legislation, sought to minimise pain and distress suffered by animals, which were 
from the outset regarded as human property. 
This legislation, however, did not apply to wild animals. Well into the 20th century, the need to protect 
wildlife was not founded on animal welfare; it was perceived (especially by those with wealth) as being 
essentially economic; preserving game and quarry species, and protecting areas in which to hunt 
them. Not until 1947, and the publication of the Ritchie Report191, was a specialist national (UK) nature 
conservation body established192 and national habitat protection measures193 instigated194. While no 
longer being solely economic, the motivation underlying such protection was still firmly 
anthropocentric, with the scientific importance of conservation to humans at the forefront. 
However, as science and modernity’s perceived failure to deliver their promise began to affect public 
opinion in the 1960s and 1970s, protection and conservation of wildlife took on a new rationale; 
nature began to be valued on aesthetic, cultural, social and wider economic grounds. Events such as 
the publication of Silent Spring195 and The Tragedy of the Commons196, Apollo 8’s first pictures of Earth 
from space197, the founding of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth198 and the UN Conference on the 
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Human Environment199 moved (at least influential) public opinion to take conservation of nature more 
seriously.200 Government policy changed accordingly. 
Important fruits of that process were two other milestones in the development of Scottish (and UK) 
wildlife law, emanating from the EU; the Birds Directive in 2009201 and the Habitats Directive in 
1992202, mostly transposed into Scots law by the Conservation (Natural Habitats &c.) Regulations 1994 
and the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. 
However much the attitude to wildlife in law has evolved its basis, however, is still utilitarian and 
anthropocentric. 
6. Typology of wildlife offences 
While not the main thrust of wildlife law, there is some legislation to prevent cruelty or unnecessary 
suffering to wild animals e.g. the Wild Mammals Protection Act 1996, the Protection of Wild Mammals 
(Scotland) Act 2002 and the Protection of Badgers Act 1992, all of which explicitly make intentionally 
inflicting unnecessary suffering (and a number of related actions) on the specified animal a criminal 
offence. However, the emphasis on conservation and protection at the species level persists. Much of 
bird and animal conservation legislation has welfare as an incidental outcome e.g. it is an offence to 
injure a wild bird and many wild animals, while the main thrust is conservation. 
6.1 Species and habitat protection 
The main legislative protection of wildlife in Scots law, the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, protects 
birds, animals and plants. It is an offence under section 1 (1) and (2) to intentionally kill or injure a wild 
bird, to intentionally destroy or damage a nest, to intentionally take or destroy eggs or to possess a 
wild bird or wild bird’s egg. Rarer (Schedule 1) birds are afforded greater protection. Animals are only 
covered if listed in Schedule 5 of the Act but include bats, reptiles, amphibians, some other mammals 
(e.g. red squirrels), fish, and butterflies. For these protected animals, there is a range of offences 
similar or analogous to those for wild birds. In respect of plants, it is an offence for anyone other than 
the owner or occupier of the land to intentionally uproot any wild plant and an offence for anyone to 
intentionally pick, uproot or destroy any of the rare wild plants in Schedule 8.203 There are also 
offences in relation to the mis-use of snares and the introduction of non-native species. 
The Conservation (Natural Habitats &c.) Regulations 1994 create further offences in relation to a small 
number of European protected species, listed in Schedules 2 and 4 and also make it an offence (in 
Regulation 18) to intentionally or recklessly damage any natural feature by reason of which land is a 
Special Protection Area or a Special Area of Conservation. These two designations204 arise from the 
Birds Directive and the Habitats Directive respectively. 
Section 19 of The Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004 makes it an offence for any person to 
intentionally or recklessly damage any natural feature specified in an SSSI notification205. 
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6.2  Protection of salmon fisheries 
The right of salmon fishing is not an incident of land ownership, but a legally separate tenement, 
acquired by express grant from the Crown or by prescription.206 These property rights are not directly 
related to the arrangements for protection and conservation of salmon stocks, the first instances of 
which may have been in the time of David I (1124-1153) and William the Lion (1165-1214).207  
The basis for modern statutory protection of salmon fishing was provided by a succession of Acts of 
the UK Parliament in the 19th and 20th centuries, culminating in the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries 
(Protection) (Scotland) Act 1951208, the Salmon Act 1986 and the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries 
(Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 2003.209 Together, these statutes provide for a wide range of criminal 
offences relating to salmon fisheries, the most basic of which is the offence of poaching; fishing for 
salmon without either the legal right to fish or written permission from a person with such a right.210 
The wide range of other offences, mostly applying to all (including proprietors), include unlawful 
methods of fishing211; fishing out with annual and weekly close times212; interfering with or obstructing 
adult or young salmon213; sale, purchase and possession of certain salmon214 and obstruction of a 
water bailiff or other enforcing officer in the exercise of their powers.215 District Salmon Fishery 
Boards216 regulate local salmon fisheries and have power to appoint water bailiffs to enforce much of 
the legislation. Water bailiffs’ powers are extensive (including search and apprehension) and are 
similar to those of police officers in respect of the legislation.217 
Unlike salmon fishing, a right of trout-fishing is an incident to the right of property.218 The right of 
fishing for brown trout in a private river, stream or loch is not a separate feudal estate but pertains to 
the ownership of the land which borders the water.219 The regulation of trout fishing is less 
comprehensive than that of salmon fishing and the offence of poaching can only be committed in very 
limited circumstances;  if a protection order220 is made in relation to a prescribed catchment area or 
part thereof of any river and trout is taken without legal right or written permission from the holder 
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of the right, an offence is committed.221 Offences analogous to those in respect of salmon exist for 
trout regarding illegal fishing methods222 and the annual close season.223 
The game laws in Scotland were radically overhauled with the coming into force of the Wildlife and 
Natural Environment (Scotland) Act 2011 which had the effect of making provision for the protection 
of game species under the ambit of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981.224 The Act includes 
provision for, inter alia, close seasons and 'poaching offences'.225 226 
6.3  Protection of Deer 
The Deer (Scotland) Act 1959 was the first piece of legislation to regulate matters relating to deer, 
including their conservation and control, close seasons, dealing in venison, offences including 
poaching and enforcement. The relevant legislation is now to be found in the Deer (Scotland) Act 
1996.227  
Under section 5, Scottish Ministers have a duty to set, by order, close seasons for the taking or killing 
of deer and contravention of such an order is an offence, though several defences are available. Under 
section 17, any person who, without legal right to take or kill deer or without permission, takes or 
wilfully kills or injures deer on any land shall be guilty of an offence. Section 22 makes it a specific 
offence for more than one person to take deer illegally There are several other connected offences 
such as taking deer at night228, use of certain firearms229 and use of vehicles.230 
6.4 Endangered species 
The 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora231 has 
been given effect to in the UK232 principally by the Endangered Species (Import and Export) Act 1976.  
It is an offence for a person to sell, offer or expose for sale, or to have in his possession or transport 
for the purpose of sale, or display to the public a live or dead animal or certain imported derivatives 
of endangered species,233 except under a licence issued by the Secretary of State for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs. 
7. Prosecution and sentencing of wildlife offences in Scotland 
All wildlife offence prosecutions are taken by COPFS, usually after referral from Police Scotland, 
though there are over fifty Specialist Reporting Agencies that can report offences, including wildlife 
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offences, to the police234. The specialist prosecution unit within COPFS also deals with wildlife 
offences. Police Scotland have the benefit of support for the collection and coordination of intelligence 
from specialist police officers of the UK National Wildlife Crime Unit (NWCU). All operational divisions 
of Police Scotland also have a Wildlife Crime Liaison Officer on their establishment.235 
7.1 Species and habitat protection 
The great majority of offences under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 contain a mens rea 
element and are triable only by summary proceedings. The sanction for those offences is a maximum 
of six months imprisonment and/or a fine not exceeding Level 5 of the Standard Scale (£5,000). An 
example of one of the exceptions is that of offences related to non-native species, which are triable 
both ways and which carry a sanction of 12 months maximum imprisonment and/or a fine not 
exceeding £40,000 for summary conviction and two years maximum imprisonment and/or an 
unlimited fine upon conviction on indictment.236 Additionally, if the summary-only offences are 
committed in respect of more than one bird, nest, egg, other animal, plant etc., the maximum fine 
which may be imposed shall be determined as if the person convicted had been convicted of a 
separate offence in respect of each bird, nest, egg, animal, plant etc. Finally, the court shall order the 
forfeiture of any bird, nest, egg, other animal, plant or other thing in respect of which the offence was 
committed; and may also order the forfeiture of any vehicle, animal, weapon etc. which was used to 
commit the offence. In the case of an offence concerning non-native species, any animal or plant 
which is of the same kind as that in respect of which the offence was committed and was found in his 
possession may also be forfeited. 
Under the Conservation (Natural Habitats &c.) Regulations 1994 most offences contain a mens rea 
element but only the regulation 18 offence is triable both ways.237 The sanction for that offence is, on 
summary conviction, a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale and, on conviction on 
indictment, an unlimited fine. The sanctions for offences against European protected species on 
summary conviction is imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months and/or to a fine not 
exceeding level 5 on the standard scale. 
Under s19 of The Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004, the offence of intentionally or recklessly 
damaging238 any natural feature specified in an SSSI notification (and related offences) is triable both 
ways and attracts, on summary conviction, a fine not exceeding £40,000, and, on conviction on 
indictment, an unlimited fine. 
7.2 Protection of salmon fisheries 
All offences in this area carry a mens rea element. The basic offence of poaching is punishable, on 
summary conviction, by a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale (£1,000).  Most other 
offences attract fines at level 3 (£1,000) or level 4 (£2,500). Only the offences of poaching with another 
or others239 , using prohibited killing methods240 and possession of illegal salmon241 are triable both 
ways and punishable, on summary conviction, by a fine not exceeding £10,000 and/or by 
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imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months and, on conviction on indictment, by an unlimited 
fine and/or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years. 
7.3 Protection of Deer 
All but one of the offences, including the s17 offence, are triable by summary complaint only and most 
of those offences are punishable by a maximum fine at level 4 (£2,500) on the standard scale or 3 
months imprisonment or both. Only the s22 offence of unlawful taking of deer and related offences 
by more than one person is triable both ways. The punishment on summary conviction is a fine of the 
statutory maximum (£10,000) in respect of each deer taken or 6 months imprisonment or both. On 
solemn conviction, the sentence is an unlimited fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years 
or both. 
Furthermore, upon conviction for any of the principal offences under the Act the court shall have the 
power to cancel any firearm or shotgun certificate held by the person and to order the forfeiture of 
any deer illegally taken and to disqualify him from holding or a licence to deal in venison.242 
7.4 Endangered species 
The principal offences in the 1976 Act are triable both ways and anyone found guilty of an offence 
shall be liable 
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding £10,000; 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine, or both. 
7.5 Practice of Wildlife Crime Sentencing in Scotland 
The criminal law represents a much larger proportion of the enforcement effort in respect of wildlife 
crime than it does in respect of environmental crime. Responsive regulation and the associated 
concept of the enforcement pyramid243 are not major features of wildlife crime enforcement in 
Scotland244. While there have been proposals to institute a systematic framework of civil liability for 
wildlife crime in England245, no such proposals have been made in Scotland. 
Scottish Natural Heritage, however, do operate a licensing system which reflects aspects of responsive 
regulation in that many activities which would otherwise be an offence against protected species are 
permitted under licence for certain specific purposes.246 Two important areas of activity which are 
regulated in this way are the killing of game and the killing of wild birds247. 
The killing of game by a person, which would otherwise be an offence (i.e. poaching), is permitted if 
the person holds permission from the owner of the property right relating to the taking of the salmon, 
trout or deer. 
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The killing of wild birds, which would otherwise be an offence under Section 1(1) of the Wildlife and 
Countryside Act 1985, is permitted under s.16 of the Act, which exempts from s.1 anything done in 
accordance with the terms of a licence granted by Scottish Natural Heritage. General Licences are a 
“light touch” regulatory instrument granted by SNH, most commonly for the purposes of conservation 
of other bird species or to prevent serious agricultural damage or to protect public health. These 
licences are known collectively as General Licences 01, 02 and 03. There is no application process, and 
no significant registration or reporting requirements is attached to the use of such General Licences. 
The “Authorised Person” is the owner or occupier of the land in question or their agents and the 
licence usually applies to named species.248  Activity that cannot be regulated by General Licences can 
sometimes be regulated by Specific Licences249 which are more onerous in respect of the application 
process, conditions and reporting requirements. 
In 2014 SNH published a framework for implementing restrictions on the use of General Licences 01, 
02 and 03 which was part of a package of measures aimed at tackling raptor persecution. The core 
principle was that the granting of General Licences would not be appropriate where there has been a 
loss of confidence, particularly in situations where there has been evidence to show that crimes 
against wild birds and breaches of the General License had taken place in areas subject to such 
licences. Those not granted General licences in these circumstances would have to apply for the more 
onerous Specific Licences. The framework was challenged by judicial review in the Court of Session in 
2017250 where, despite losing on one point, the legality of SNH’s policy was upheld overall. The 
judgement now enables SNH to continue, and possibly expand into other areas, the policy which, 
crucially, makes possible the exercise of a limited degree of discretion, for some sanctions to be 
applied to those breaching licence conditions without having to immediately resort to the expense 
(and evidential challenges) associated with recommending criminal prosecution. 
The ambivalences that can be seen to be inherent in attitudes to environmental crime are, to some 
extent, apparent in attitudes to wildlife crime. Much of what would otherwise be criminal is rendered 
otherwise by societal norms (hunting of game and fishing) or by exceptions related to economic or 
other human necessities (destruction of pests or vermin) so the tension between economic pressure 
and wildlife law to some extent mirrors that between economic pressure and environmental law. 
Other sources of ambivalence are, however, less apparent in respect of wildlife crime. Because of the 
largely enforcement-driven approach to wildlife crime there is much less scope for the exercise of 
discretion, notwithstanding the recent incremental changes. There may also be less chance of 
“capture” taking place of those enforcing the law, as is potentially the case with environmental 
legislation. There has been no research into the phenomenon in respect of wildlife enforcement in 
Scotland251 but it may be reasonable to surmise that, not only is there less day to day contact between 
enforcement officials and potential wildlife offenders than is the case in the environmental arena, but 
also that “job-switching” and resultant blurring of loyalties is less prevalent in the wildlife arena. 
All wildlife offence prosecutions are taken by COPFS, usually after referral from Police Scotland, 
though there are over fifty Specialist Reporting Agencies that can report offences, including wildlife 
offences, to the police252. The specialist prosecution unit within COPFS also deals with wildlife 
offences. Police Scotland have the benefit of support for the collection and coordination of intelligence 
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from specialist police officers of the UK National Wildlife Crime Unit (NWCU). All operational divisions 
of Police Scotland also have a Wildlife Crime Liaison Officer on their establishment.253 
As with an environmental prosecution, the decision as to whether or not to proceed with a wildlife 
criminal prosecution lies entirely within the discretion of COPFS and will depend on its assessment of 
whether there is both sufficient admissible, reliable evidence and sufficient public interest in 
proceeding.254 The prosecution is also the ‘master of the instance’ in respect of wildlife crime and 
therefore decides whether to proceed by way of summary proceedings255 or solemn proceedings.256 
There is no right to trial by jury on request. 
One significant feature of  Scots wildlife law is the vicarious liability offence under section 24 of the 
Wildlife and Natural Environment (Scotland) Act 2011. Under that provision, landowners (or 
managers) can be found criminally liable for the actions of employees which cause death or injury to 
wild birds or cause interference to their nests. Landowners must show that as well as being unaware 
of the offence being committed, they had taken “all reasonable steps and due diligence” to prevent 
offences being committed on their land. This was enacted largely in response to public pressure, often 
through wildlife charities and pressure groups, to take action against the perceived persecution of 
raptors by large commercial shooting estates. 
Complex attitudes to animals persist in the UK and Scotland, where animals are generally protected 
by law, but are still reared specifically for shooting or catching and where resistance to legislation to 
control field sports continues.  The debate around the Hunting Act 2004 was often characterised as 
‘town versus country’, with the former (affluent, socially advantaged) sections of society allegedly 
seeking to impose their will on the latter (less affluent, less socially advantaged) sections of society. 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (almost all charities) play an influential role in shaping policy 
involved in wildlife crime in the UK and some are large professional organisations, comparable with 
medium to large businesses, rather than being grass roots or ‘activists’ movements.257 
 The resources available, for example, to the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) for 
charitable purposes in 2017/18 was £101m and its membership numbered over 1,219,000258. The 
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) had an expenditure of over £129m in 
2017.259  Both the RSPCA and the RSPB are both incorporated under Royal Charter which grants them 
significant legitimacy within civil society. This, and the public support for these organisations, together 
with the resources available for campaigning and political lobbying, allows the main environmental 
NGOs to take a lead in promoting wildlife crime as an issue of importance.  It also places the 
organisations in a position to employ expertise, for example, specialist investigators and political 
lobbyists, to promote their policy objectives and adopt a position of being expert in their chosen field, 
while their socio-economic position allows them to exploit that perceived expertise260. 
Another significant influence on the debate round wildlife crime is the campaigning blogs and websites 
facilitated by the ubiquity, cost-effectiveness and ease of digital communication. These digital 
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platforms (most prominently focussing on raptor persecution) can be more agile and responsive than 
traditional lobbyists to perceived failings in the enforcement of wildlife criminal law and are less 
constrained by considerations of mass memberships and socio-political standing, enabling more 
trenchant critiques of these perceived failings than those made by their traditional counterparts. 
As with environmental crimes, there is a perception amongst a wide range of campaigners and 
pressure groups that the current prosecution and sentencing of wildlife crime is inadequate and that 
not only should tougher sentences be handed down on conviction but also prosecutor and judicial 
approaches to wildlife crime need to more clearly reflect the harm done to wildlife and society by 
wildlife crime.261 
Many of the themes above are reflected in the 2017 controversy over the decision by the Wildlife and 
Environmental Crime Unit (WECU) in the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service not to proceed 
with criminal proceedings in cases of alleged offences against birds protected by virtue of the Wildlife 
and Countryside Act 1981 s.1 and Sch.1. There was deep frustration and anger expressed by voluntary 
wildlife activists regarding the decision262 and the matter was taken up by the Scottish Parliament’s 
Environment, Climate Change and Land Reform Committee. In a letter to the Committee263, the WECU 
explained that important video evidence obtained covertly by the RSPB on private land was judged by 
prosecutors to be irregularly obtained and, in the circumstances, therefore inadmissible under the 
common law doctrine established in Lawrie v Muir 1950 JC 19264. The circumstances were that the 
WECU decided that the RSPB had no statutory access rights under section 1 of the Land Reform 
(Scotland) Act 2003 nor had powers to carry out covert surveillance under the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000, meaning that the irregularity could not be excused. 
Academic comment has tended to support WECU’s position265 and one author has also suggested that 
a way of making such evidence admissible in the future would be to amend s.8 of the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000 to designate the RSPB as a “relevant public authority”266. 
7.6 Wildlife offenders 
In respect of environmental offending, most authors see offenders as rational economic actors267. 
However, the situation in respect of wildlife offending is more complex. While rational economic 
factors are relevant to some extent, other factors have been suggested as also being in play. This is 
particularly of interest given the focus on a deterrence model which mostly uses the criminal law to 
regulate wildlife crime rather than the responsive regulation model associated with environmental 
crime. The assumption underpinning the deterrence model is that offenders are rational, responsible 
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individuals who calculate the risks associated with crime before deciding whether to commit an 
offence268  It is this assumption that has been challenged by some, many of the challenges displaying 
“a healthy scepticism about the effectiveness of deterrence through prosecution and sentencing.”269 
Firstly, however, there can obviously be clear rational economic motivations for wildlife crime. For 
example, game poaching can be lucrative and, if re-sale of game is not the motive, access to the 
sporting challenge by legal means is often prohibitively expensive; economic damage to agricultural 
enterprise resulting from sea-eagles or geese can be significant; the economic advantage in using 
protected habitats in contravention of the law can be determinative or the illegal protection of very 
high value resources such as driven game birds can be too great a temptation. 
The work focussing on wildlife offending as rational, instrumental behaviour has highlighted three 
main factors which render the deterrent model relatively ineffective; under-resourcing of enforcers 
at all levels, attitudes to wildlife crime and lack of deterrent effect on potential offenders.270 
Under-resourcing is a familiar element in the perceived ineffectiveness of the deterrence model. 
Critics point to insufficient numbers of personnel amongst SNH, Police Scotland and the prosecution 
service, despite the creation of the UK police staffed National Wildlife Crime Unit and the Wildlife and 
Environmental Crime Unit (WECU) in the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service. A lack of basic 
material resources, such as vehicles and other necessary equipment is perceived, leading to lack of 
data collection and sharing tools, access to forensic analysis and more advanced assistive technology 
(such as surveillance equipment). Under-resourcing can also manifest as insufficient training for 
enforcement agents, prosecutors and the judiciary thus reducing their capacity to effectively enforce 
legislation and sentence appropriately.271 
Equally familiar is the perception that policy makers and the judiciary do not take wildlife crime 
seriously, that numbers of prosecutions are low, numbers of convictions are even lower, initiating a 
vicious circle which is closed by low sentencing and then perpetuated.272 
The above factors combine to suggest that the elements of successful deterrence do not exist for 
wildlife crimes. There is little perceived certainty of being detected and convicted (especially in wild, 
sparsely populated and remote locations, subject to extreme environmental conditions) and the 
severity of the punishments given to those few offenders who are convicted is often considered low 
in relation to the harm caused and/ or the rewards gained.273 Wellsmith has written that 
decades of criminological research suggest that reductivist sentencing based on deterrence is 
unsuccessful in reducing crime rates. This same research suggests that certainty of punishment is 
more important than severity in achieving deterrence, yet certainty is the most difficult element to 
control. Further, people are more deterred by the sanctions of a personally relevant collective, than 
they are by the sanctions of the criminal justice system to their actions.274 
This last issue points to the other motivations, other than economically rational ones, that can lead to 
wildlife crime. Meanwhile, the argument that persistent and damaging wildlife crime is a consequence 
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of weak legislation and ineffective sentencing reflects the ‘common sense’ approach to crime and 
arguably represents an easy ‘sell’ to the public and policy makers.275 Angus Nurse writes: 
… investigators regularly encounter the same offender over and over again and evidence exists that 
even those offenders who are repeatedly caught convicted and fined are not deterred.  Egg collector 
Colin Watson for example was caught and convicted six times; had paid fines of thousands of pounds 
and had his collection of eggs confiscated.  Despite the fact that he was known to police and staff 
involved in protecting rare birds’ nests he was suspected of still being involved in an egg collecting 
expedition when he fell to his death in May 2006.276 
Much of the work looking behind the traditional economic rationality approach to wildlife crime can 
be traced back to Sykes and Matza’s277 work on theories of delinquency in the 1950s where 
“neutralisation techniques” were identified that served to justify and rationalise offenders’ behaviour. 
In this approach to wildlife crime, its drivers are normative and social, rather than the cost-benefit 
rational choices discussed above. Wildlife crime may therefore make sense within communities that 
are e.g. especially protective of their local landscape and culture, usurped by new values or for new 
agendas, protective of conservative agrarian values, that are able to “drift”278 toward rationalizations 
that neutralize their deviance, particularly to affinity groups in their own communities. In this way, 
while wildlife crime can be understood as rational, the full picture behind the crime is attained only 
once we move away from seeing it as solely instrumental and begin to see it as expressive of a more 
complex interplay of law, legitimacy (and perceived legitimacy) and morality in rural communities279.  
Von Essen and Nurse summarise the position well: 
… wildlife is no longer a ‘private good’, inasmuch as it ever was – indeed, for most of history the 
public has objected to the privatization, enclosure and appropriation of res nullius … Conservation 
directives have explicitly redefined wildlife as a public good for future generations. It is no longer 
the local …. community’s …. resource to govern autonomously, but it is seen to be of shared value— 
indeed even a commodity—to a global community, and often also to command intrinsic value… The 
result is that hunters, farmers, ranchers, shepherds and rural residents now experience their local 
wildlife appropriated by supranational conservation agendas or national directives where states 
consider the wider public good in protecting wildlife against the local interests and ‘rights’ of 
particular groups. Accordingly, (these rural residents) may find that they can no longer hunt or 
manage populations of protected species without oversight of law enforcement, ENGOs and the 
public and that what they may perceive as traditional rights and cultural practices have now become 
tightly regulated.280  
Enticott’s 2011 study of wildlife crime in England and Wales, focusses on the illegal culling of badgers 
(strongly implicated in the spread of the economically damaging disease of bovine TB (bTB)) by 
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farmers. It illustrates the above motivations and “neutralisations”281 and highlights four particularly 
relevant ones. 
The first is what Enticott calls “the defence of necessity”, which focussed on the economic viability of 
individual farms and which was perceived to be at risk because of the presence of bTB-carrying 
badgers; a common theme was that “it was either the business or the badger”.282 
The second is termed “denial of necessity for the law”, which involves advocating the right of 
offenders to usurp the law because of the offenders’ knowledge and experience of nature and the 
countryside, especially the local area. In taking this position, farmers claimed their own expertise 
(rather than that of outsider scientists) as the most legitimate source of knowledge with which to 
inform policy towards badgers. There was no need for the law because locals were better placed to 
look after the countryside. A common theme was “people that know about wildlife…they’re the ones 
that need to be listened to”.283 
Thirdly, Enticott identified what he called the “appeal to higher loyalties”, which prioritised individuals’ 
relationships with the local community above those with society at large and which also placed more 
value on local people and their way of life than on the lives of individual animals.284 
Finally, there was what Enticott termed “condemnation of the condemners”, most of which focussed 
on scientists and policy makers on one hand and campaigning badger conservation groups on the 
other. Both groups were perceived as interfering and ignorant of the countryside and, further, of 
having a deficient moral compass regarding animals and their welfare because of inter alia pursuing 
one-species policies that disrupted the balance of nature, advocating that bTB-infected badgers be 
left to die and prioritising the welfare of badgers over the welfare of farm livestock. 
The criminology of wildlife crime (at least in the first-world context) is in its relative infancy but 
variations on the same theme can be discerned in research on community responses to protection 
and/or re-wilding policies in respect of gray wolves (in Denmark285 and Norway286) and sea eagles (in 
the Republic of Ireland287). 
7.7 Statistical data on wildlife offences in Scotland 
There are two principle sources of published data regarding wildlife crime and sentencing in Scotland: 
the Wildlife Crime Penalties Review Group Report of 2015288 and the Scottish Government Wildlife 
Crime in Scotland Annual Reports289. Scotland is a small jurisdiction and, while there are perceptions 
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amongst many that wildlife crime is under-reported, the low number of convictions and disposals 
makes analysis of the data difficult. 
The Poustie Report of 2015 examined data about convictions and sentences for wildlife crime from 
2009-10 to 2013-14.  The Scottish Government Wildlife Crime in Scotland Annual Reports provides 
data on convictions and sentences for wildlife crime from 2011-12 to 2015-16. The Poustie Report 
noted that the number of convictions during the five years from 2009-10 to 2013-14 had risen from 
24 to 60, but then there were 35 convictions in 2014-15 and by 2015-16 the number of convictions 
had fallen to 20. By far the most common disposal was a monetary fine. See Table 3. 
Table 3: People with a conviction for wildlife offences in Scottish Courts, by main penalty, 2009-10 to 











* * 71 77 80 51 25 
People with a 
conviction 
24 37 48 56 60 35 20 
Of which 
received: 
       
Custody 1  1 1 1 1 1 
Community 
Sentence 
  7 8 4 2 4 
Monetary 18 33 37 33 43 28 11 
Other 5 4 3 14 12 4 4 
Source: Scottish Government Wildlife Crime in Scotland Annual Report 2016. The Wildlife Crime 
Penalties Review Group 2015.   *Data for 2009-10 and 2010-11 has been extracted and collated 
from The Wildlife Crime Penalties Review Group Report which does not contain data on the number 
of people proceeded against. 
 
Between 2005-06 and 2015-16, six people received a custodial sentence in Scottish courts where a 
wildlife offence was the main offence.  There were no custodial sentences imposed in 2006-07, 2007-
08, 2009-10 or 2010-11.  Whilst this is a very small number of custodial sentences and care must be 
taken in interpreting this data, it is worth noting that the three longest sentences were given during 





Table 4: People receiving custodial sentence in Scottish Courts for Wildlife offences by length of 
sentence 









2014 -15  






      1 1  1  
 sentence 
in days 






   1        
 sentence 
in days 





1        1   
 sentence 
in days 
60        182   
Sources: Wildlife Crime Penalties Review Group Report 2015, data from RSPB Bird Crime Reports 
2011-16 and Scottish Government Wildlife Crime in Scotland Annual Reports 2014, 2015 and 
2016. 
 
The Poustie Report provided information on average fines per year stating there was ‘no evidence of 
a trend in average fines: although average fines decreased from £637 (based on 18 fines imposed) to 
£402 (based on 43 fines imposed), the figures in 2009-10 were skewed by 2 averages fines of £2150 
for offences involving badgers, omitting which reduces the average to £448.’ See Table 3. 
Poustie further noted; ‘However, taking a much longer perspective on the data available (from 
1989/90 to 2013/14), it is nonetheless fair to say that average fines are rising against a background of 
what appears to be lower levels of convictions’, though the Report also observed that the increase in 
fine levels from £141 in 1989/90 to £402 in 2013/14 could persuasively be attributed to inflation.    
It is not possible to examine average fines for 2014-15 and 2015-16 as the Scottish Government 









Table 5: Sentence - Average Fine 




Total Fines Number 18 33 37 33 43 
 Average(£) 637 308 462 389 402 
Badgers Number 2 3 1  6 
 Av (£) 2150 367 400  967 
Birds Number 3 3 10 9 4 
 Av (£) 417 417 439 473 1375 
Other Conservation offences Number 1  1   
 Av (£) 1000  480   
Cruelty to wild animals Number 1 1 3 4 1 
 Av (£) 450 170 450 261 500 
Deer Number  3 2 1 3 
 Av (£)  717 300 750 583 
Possession of salmon or trout 
unlawfully obtained 
Number  1 1 2  
 Av (£)  866 50 900  
Salmon and freshwater 
fisheries offences 
Number 2 15 11 10 27 
 Av (£) 125 194 278 278 236 
Hunting with dogs Number 6 3  2 4 
 Av (£) 467 417  300 348 
Poaching and game laws Number 3 3 3   
 Av (£) 473 93 213   
Other wildlife offences Number   5 5 4 
 Av (£)   1227 320 438 
Source: The Wildlife Crime Penalties Review Group. 
Data from the Scottish Government Wildlife Crime Annual Reports is reproduced below: 
Table 6: Five Year Average Fines 
 2009-10 to 2013-14 
Average Fine (£) 
2010-11 to 2014-15 
Average Fine (£) 
2011-12 to 2015-16 
Average Fine (£) 
Offences relating to:    
Badgers 967 967 400 
Birds 574 598 684 
Conservation 
(protected sites) 
335 390 480 
Cruelty to wild 
animals 
583 535 417 
Deer 403 416 457 
Fish Poaching  260 260 257 
Hunting with dogs 263 253 378 
Poaching and game 
laws 
740 740 213 
Other wildlife 
offences 
678 515 623 
Overall Average 420 411 428 
Source: Scottish Government Wildlife Crime in Scotland Annual Reports 2014, 2015 and 2016. 
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Interpretation from five-year averages makes trends in fine amounts imposed very difficult to discern.  
It is therefore not possible to comment of this data in a meaningful way. There is some further data 
available from RSPB Annual Bird Crime Reports on sentences imposed for offences involving wild birds.  
See Table 7. 
Table 7: Sentences imposed for offences involving wild birds 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 







from £350 to 















 Ranged from 
100 hours to 
180 hours 
One of 220 
hours 
 One of 240 
hours 
 
Other  Admonished     
Source: RSPB Wild Bird Crime Reports, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016. 
 
The number of convictions is small, making interpretation of the dataset difficult. However, the 
maximum fine is generally following an increasing trend.  The number of community sentences is very 
small and it is not possible to comment on any trend. 
There are some difficulties in evaluating the available data. The numbers of convictions are very low, 
particularly recently, making any inferences from the data unreliable. The Scottish Government 
Criminal Proceedings Database does not report wildlife crime as a discrete category, including it 
presumably in the Other Crime category. The reporting of fine levels as averages can be misleading as 
an average, especially of a small number, can be influenced significantly by a single figure. Five-year 
average reporting makes the discerning of medium term trends difficult. Finally, the two major data 
sources displayed some inconsistencies in reporting methodology. 
Accordingly, only limited conclusions can be drawn from this data. One is that monetary fines are by 
far the most frequent disposition upon conviction. It is difficult to discern a trend in the number of 
convictions for wildlife offences between 2009/10 and 2015/16; the numbers rose from 24 to 60 and 
back to 24 during the period. It may be possible to say that fine levels are rising on a long-term basis 
but that may well be attributable to inflation alone. Unfortunately, it is not possible to draw any 
conclusions from the six custodial sentences imposed between 2005/06 and 2015/16. 
8. Summary and conclusions 
The previous review has mapped out environmental and wildlife offences under Scottish criminal law 
and reviewed their prosecution and sentencing by Scottish courts. It has shown that the historical 
roots of specific types of offences reach far back in time, especially as regards the protection of 
wildlife. In so doing, it reflects how the evolution of the cultural and moral foundations of the human 
society with its natural environment have permeated Scottish law and sentencing practices. In 
essence, the regulatory rationale for the protection of wildlife through criminal law has evolved 
considerably over time from the utilitarian management of specific species from over-hunting or 
harvesting for commercial purposes, to a more comprehensive and sustainable management of 
autochthonous biodiversity under an ecosystem approach. International and, especially EU 
environmental law, have considerably influenced this evolution with the transposition of the Birds and 
Habitats Directives 
[47] 
 into the UK and Scottish legal orders. Equally, the ratification by the UK of the 1973 CITES led to the 
introduction of offences related to illegal trade in endangered species into the UK statute book. 
Eventually, the definition of wildlife offences was loosely harmonised across all EU Member States 
through the ECD.290  
Environmental crimes, as opposed to wildlife crimes, encompass a diverse typology of offences that 
aim at protecting a heterogeneous set of interests related to the protection of the environment in the 
context of sustainable development governance. The common denominator to all of these offences 
is, however, their nature of regulatory crimes. The specific definition of environmental offences, 
whether they relate to the management and disposal of wastes, water management or industrial 
emissions, is the criminalisation of particularly severe infractions of environmental regulations. Also 
in this context, environmental crimes were loosely harmonised through the ECD at European level in 
order to ensure a level playing field across all Member States.291 Despite the fact that the UK and 
Scotland have significantly gone beyond the requirements of the ECD in its transposition, this has not 
prevented, however, a somewhat scattered, piecemeal and patchwork legislation regarding both 
wildlife and environmental crimes.  
Ever since the emergence of environmental law as a specialised area of public law with a discrete set 
of principles and rules, criminal law has been seen as a legitimate tool for environmental law 
enforcement. Over time, however, in the broader context of environmental regulation criminal law is 
increasingly conceived and used as a last resort category, as the ‘hardest’ tool in the broader 
enforcement toolkit. This review compiles and assesses statistical data about the sentencing of 
environmental and wildlife crimes by Scottish courts against the backdrop of other comparable 
jurisdictions, most notably England and Wales. It reveals that criminal law is very prudently used in 
Scotland for the enforcement of environmental regulations. While the review has sought not to make 
any qualitative judgment in the assessment of the compiled statistical data, the authors cautiously 
advance that statistical data suggest a varying degree of ambivalence in the sentencing of the different 
types of environmental and wildlife crimes that have been reviewed. This ambivalence seems to 
suggest that a combination of technical factors (such as the nature of regulatory offences of 
environmental and wildlife crimes), but also other subjective factors (not least the personal moral 
beliefs and world views of individual judges), contribute to the aforementioned ambivalence in the 
sentencing process.  
The future sentencing guidelines for environmental and wildlife crimes in Scotland should therefore 
provide clearest possible guidance as to sentencing criteria and the degree of discretion that judges 
ought to have in the sentencing of environmental and wildlife crimes. 
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